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DOGMATISM, COPING, AND SPIRITUALITY:   
PREDICTING MENTAL HEALTH AMONG THE RELIGIOUS AND THE SECULAR 
 
Jonathan T. Moore 
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 Religiousness has frequently been found to positively predict numerous types of 
beneficial mental health variables in previous literature.  These results have often been 
inferred by scholars to mean that secular groups have poorer levels of mental health 
despite rarely including secular populations in studies.  An ideological diverse sample of 
4,667 respondents provided usable data in the current correlational study that measured 
the relationships between general dogmatism levels, existential belief strength, spiritual 
coping, spiritual harmony (i.e., the degree to which one lives in accordance with their 
self-defined values) and six indicators of mental health.  The sample was comprised 
mainly of agnostic, atheist, Buddhist, Christian, Jewish, and spiritual nonreligious 
participants.  Multi-group analyses within structural equation models and multivariate 
analysis of covariance procedures were used to investigate hypotheses.  The data showed 
that religious and secular adherents had null differences on five of the six mental health 
indicators.  Further, dogmatism, existential belief strength, and spiritual coping levels all 
had small-sized standardized regression weights that were statistically significant but 
weakly predictive of mental health levels even when measured at the ideological group 
level.  Spiritual harmony levels were the only statistically significant standardized 
vi 
 
regression weight across all groups that was large in magnitude.  The implications of the 
current study suggest that living in accordance with one’s spiritual values, regardless of 
how those values are defined, is strongly characteristic of better mental health.   
vii 
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INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
  Debate regarding the relationship between religion and mental health has endured 
for decades.  Prominent figures of the field of psychology have often weighed in on 
opposing sides on whether there is a positive association between religious aspects and 
mental health or a negative relationship between the two.  Both Sigmund Freud 
(1927/1964) and Albert Ellis (1971) articulated that psychopathology co-occurs with 
religiousness while other pioneers in the field, such as Carl Jung (1933/1947) and Gordon 
Allport (1950), argued that religion contributed beneficially to one’s psychological well-
being.   
Definitions 
 Before proceeding, a clarification of terms will be provided.  These definitions are 
in no way final, and instead are reflective of their consistent usage in psychological 
research while achieving a respectable, albeit limited, degree of comprehensiveness.  
Religion is “a system of beliefs in a divine or superhuman power, and practices of 
worship or other rituals directed towards such a power” (Argyle & Beit-Hallahmi, 1975, 
p. 1).  This definition is used because by regarding religion as a system it implies that 
religion is a social institution that one can be affiliated with which separates religion 
somewhat from other terms (e.g., spirituality).  Likewise, the term religiousness will be 




used to describe one’s level of commitment to their religion.  Religiousness (i.e., 
religiosity) is operationalized in the literature a number of ways:  attendance of religious 
services, agreement with religious doctrines, or the frequency that one prays or meditates, 
among many others.   
 Secular is an adjective that denotes something as having no religious affiliation.  
As follows, a secular person refers to one who is nonreligious or one who is indifferent or 
oblivious to religion (Zuckerman, 2009).  Often included in this secular category are 
those who consider themselves atheists, agnostics, and those who consider themselves 
spiritual but not religious.  Zuckerman defines an atheist as someone who does not 
believe that God exists or finds the concept of God meaningless or incoherent.  While 
agnostics, according to Zuckerman, commonly take two distinct forms.  Agnostics are 
either unsure/undecided about the existence of God, or they believe that the existence of 
God is beyond the scope of human comprehension and is a concept that is unknowable.   
 Health is a value laden term that is understood differently depending on the 
cultural perspective and the context.  In deference to this diversity, the term mental health 
will be used in a broad sense that includes any psychological characteristic that indicates 
the degree to which one is experiencing better functioning (e.g., high quality of life), 
adaptive traits (e.g., resiliency), attributes that would commonly be regarded as 
advantageous (e.g., positive affect), or the extent that one is not experiencing attributes 
that impair normal functioning (e.g., depressive symptoms), are maladaptive (e.g., 
aggressiveness), or would commonly be regarded as unfavorable (e.g., suicidality).   
 Other pertinent terms will be defined as they are introduced.   
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Where the Debate Stands Now 
 The scholarly discourse and associated research regarding the religion and mental 
health connection has continued in more recent times.  Koenig and Larson (2001) 
supplied a narrative review of the research in the past century and found that 
religiousness frequently showed a favorable relationship with indicators of mental health, 
such as lower rates of depression and substance abuse and higher rates of psychological 
well-being and life satisfaction.  Schumaker’s (1992) review summarized several studies 
indicating that higher levels of religiousness are associated with lower levels of 
pathological symptomology.  Schumaker posited that “irreligion” leads to mental health 
consequences by inhibiting social and cognitive pathways to psychological health.  
Koenig, McCullough, and Larson (2001), the most comprehensive review of its kind, 
examined several hundred articles and frequently came across findings that greater 
religiousness was positively associated with numerous mental health variables:  life 
satisfaction, happiness, positive affect, and/or morale (in 79 out of 100 studies); greater 
purpose and meaning and life (in 15 out of 16 studies); greater self-esteem (in 16 out of 
28 studies); healthier adaptation to bereavement (in 8 out of 17 studies); less loneliness 
(in 4 out of 10 studies); less depression (in 60 out of 93 studies); less suicidality (in 57 
out of 68 studies); less anxiety (in 35 out of 69 studies); less psychosis (in 4 out of 10 
studies); and less substance abuse (in 124 out of 136 studies).  Bergin (1983) 
demonstrated via meta-analytic methods that there was a small, positive relationship 
between religiousness and favorable indicators of mental health.  The acceptance of the 
connection between religion and mental health is becoming so widespread and supported 
that Sloan and Bagiella (2002) noted that many training programs now include 
   
 
4 
preparation for integrating spiritual components into clinical work and that insurance 
companies, notorious for typically reimbursing only beneficial and empirically supported 
treatments (Ambrose, 1997), are compensating their consumers for spiritual counseling.  
Given the preponderance of these scholarly positions and empirical evidence, perhaps 
social scientists have settled the debate that mental health and religion co-occur 
harmoniously.   
 However, to accept such a conclusion would be disregarding a noticeably 
substantial portion of studies, numbering more than a hundred (about 25%) of the 
aforementioned works reviewed in Koenig et al. (2001), that have found either an 
absence of a relation or an inverse relation between religion and mental health.   While 
conceivable, it is unlikely that such a large number of studies could find an inverse or 
absent relationship purely due to methodological or statistical issues such as insufficient 
statistical power.  Resultantly, other explanations exploring the relationships should be 
investigated.  Beit-Hallahmi (2007) supplied a narrative review of the psychological 
profiles of atheists and concluded that atheists are not necessarily anymore neurotic than 
religious individuals.  Other exceptions to the momentous tide of positive associative 
findings between religion and mental health have manifested across multiple definitions 
of mental health.  For example, neuroticism and other negativistic traits were indicated in 
similar magnitudes between differing levels of religiousness (Francis, Pearson, Carter, & 
Kay, 1981; Sharkey & Malony, 1986).  King and Schafer (1992) did not find a 
relationship between religious experience and perceived stress but found a positive 
relationship between perceived stress and church attendance.  According to Sorenson, 
Grindstaff, and Turner (1995), depressive symptoms were the least numerous in those 
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who identified as not at all religious.  Maslow (1970) found that those who were 
classified as self-actualized (i.e., living to their potential) were more likely to be atheists.  
Hunsberger, Pratt, and Pancer (2001a) found that psychological adjustment (e.g., self-
esteem, optimism) was essentially no different between those socialized as nonreligious 
to those with religious upbringings among adolescents.  Breaking from the single time 
point data collection models, Atchley’s (1997) 14 year longitudinal study demonstrated 
that participants who maintained their religiousness or nonreligiousness across the study 
shared insignificant differences between each other in regards to their self-rated health, 
functional health, and morale levels at the conclusion of the study.  Overall, a noticeable 
host of studies have found inverse or absent relations between religiousness among a 
variety of different mental health variables.   
Notable Analyses Exploring the Relationship  
 The relationship between religion and mental health has revealed complex 
interrelations with each other when analyzed and defined carefully.  Ventis (1995) 
astutely demonstrated that the way one defines both religious orientation and mental 
health has important implications for revealing potential associations.  Ventis noted that 
the directionality and strength of the relationship between religious and mental health 
variables will vary depending on the definitions of the constructs used.  Using Allport 
and Ross’s (1967) intrinsic and extrinsic type religious orientations, as well as Batson, 
Schoenrade and Ventis’ (1993) religion-as-quest- orientation, Ventis noted that intrinsic 
orientations were associated with positive indicators of mental health, such as a self-
actualization, appropriate social behavior, and lower rates of worry and guilt, to name a 
few.  Additionally, Ventis’ review of the literature found that extrinsic orientations often 
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had negative relationships with several of these definitions of mental health while 
religion-as-quest possessed mixed relationships.   
 Hackney and Sanders (2003) further confirmed the nuanced relationship between 
religion and mental health as previously detailed by Ventis (1995).  Hackney and 
Sanders’ meta analysis indicated that generally the relationship between religious and 
mental health constructs produced an overall effect size of r =.10 that was resultant from 
a heterogenous pool of effect sizes. In other words, the general relationship between 
religiousness and mental health appeared to be strongly affected by unmeasured 
influences.  In contrast, when the authors used more specific definitions of mental health, 
namely psychological distress, life satisfaction, and self-actualization, it was found that 
those who exhibited a religious style of personal devotedness (e.g., strong attachment to 
God) possessed effect sizes of .11, .14, and .32, respectively.  When religious style was 
defined as an institutional type of religiousness (e.g., attended church), the effects were 
weaker and sometimes negative in relation to the various constructs of mental health just 
noted.  Specifically, institutional type effect sizes for psychological distress, life 
satisfaction, and self-actualization were -.03, .10 and .07, respectively.  Hackney and 
Sanders’ study noted evidence of heterogeneity of the localized effect sizes for both of 
the religiousness constructs. This suggested that other moderating influences are involved 
that may dictate the nature of the relationship between various conceptualizations and 
definitions of both religiousness and mental health. 
The Overlooked Curvilinear Relationship and Dogmatism 
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 In addition to the studies that found statistically nonsignificant differences in 
mental health between religious and secular participants, other empirical evidence 
supports a compelling claim that the oft declared “linear” relationship (i.e., as 
religiousness increases so do mental health levels), as it is sometimes called (e.g., Galen 
& Kloet, 2010), does not fully capture the complexity of the association between these 
two variables.   
 Curvilinear relationship.  Among studies that have tested for curvilinear effects, 
evidence for a curvilinear relationship between mental health variables and 
religiousness/secularity levels have been demonstrated (Buggle, Bister, Nohe, Scheider, 
& Uhmann, 2000; Diener & Clifton, 2002; Galen & Kloet, 2010; Maselko & Buka, 2008; 
Riley, 2005; Ross, 1990; Schnittker, 2001; Shaver, Lenauer & Sadd, 1980; Wilkinson & 
Coleman, 2010).  The curvilinear effect suggests that those who are strongly religious or 
strongly secular (e.g., highly atheistic) are more likely to experience better mental health 
than agnostics, religious “nones” (i.e., those who identify as having no religious 
affiliation), skeptics and doubters, and the less religious.  Figure 1 provides an example.  
Studies that have found support for a linear effect have often considered that secular 
persons can be combined with the less religious (e.g., Pollner, 1989).  Thus, the linear 
model has erroneously implied that secular groups, such as atheists, would experience 
poorer mental health because they are essentially no different from groups who are not 
highly religious.  This methodological issue will be elaborated on in the appropriate 
section.   




Figure 1.  An example supporting a curvilinear relationship between theistic/atheistic 
certainty and indicators of mental health.  From “Mental well-being in the religious and 
non-religious:  Evidence for a curvilinear relationship,” by L.W. Galen & J.D. Kloet, 
2010,  Mental Health, Religion, & Culture, p.11.  Advance online publication.  Copyright 
2011, by Taylor & Francis Online.   Reprinted with permission.    
 Dogmatism.  A commonly used method of quantifying one’s religiousness or 
secularity is to gauge how strongly one believes in their ideology, or in other words, 
one’s level of dogmatism.  Altemeyer’s (1996) definition of dogmatism referred to it as 
an unjustified certainty and conviction that is resilient against opposing beliefs.  
Dogmatism, in this context, differs from constructs like cognitive rigidity in that 
dogmatism focuses on one’s beliefs about important life issues, while cognitive rigidity is 
often operationalized as lacking critical thinking or limited creativity in one’s responses 
in everyday tasks (e.g., Schotte & Clum, 1982).  As Ross (1990) demonstrated, 
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measuring one’s strength of beliefs is a key variable to consider, which contradicts the 
typical scholarly procedure of simply measuring whether those beliefs are religious or 
not.  Ross’ study is also notable in that it found the curvilinear effect (i.e., higher levels of 
belief strength, either religious or secular, both related to greater mental health) across 
multiple groups, including Protestants, Catholics, Jews, as well as those who identified as 
having no religion.  Similarly, Galen and Kloet (2010) found the same type of curvilinear 
relationship with mental health when asking participants to clarify their level of certainty 
that God exists/does not exist (as was illustrated for Figure 1).  Buggle et al.’s (2000) 
methodology was similar in that they also gauged for degrees of religious belief but their 
methodology slightly differed in that their secular comparison group was made up of 
highly dogmatic participants who considered themselves “militant” or “determined” 
atheists.  Nonetheless, the same curvilinear relationship was found.   
 It is important to note that similar to religiousness, there are various degrees of 
nonreligion or secularity.  For example, Whitley (2010) described atheists who simply 
lack a belief in God as compared to atheists who assertively commit themselves to a 
disbelief in God.  The latter group would qualify as the more dogmatic with their secular 
worldview.   
 Not only is the curvilinear relationship being evidenced across multiple 
conceptualizations of ideological strength or dogmatism, but it is also being corroborated 
across several different indicators of mental health.  The curvilinear effect was seen in 
general measures of psychological distress or psychiatric symptomology (Ross, 1990; 
Shaver et al., 1980), emotional stability and life satisfaction (Galen & Kloet, 2010), 
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lifetime prevalence of a psychiatric disorder (Maselko & Buka, 2008), and depressive 
symptomology (Buggle et al., 2000, Schnittker, 2001; Wilkinson & Coleman, 2010). 
 By considering belief strength or higher levels of certainty, regardless of their 
ideological underpinnings, are arguably the salient factor that accompanies better mental 
health, studying weaker allegiances and more skeptical belief systems may help increase 
scholarly understanding of the relationship with mental health effects.  Previous research 
is consistent with weaker allegiance and skeptical belief systems relating to poorer mental 
health.  Lower levels of dogmatism have been predictive of higher anxiety levels 
(Rokeach, 1960) and more pathological psychological profiles (Richek, Mayo, & 
Puryear, 1970).  Religious doubt has been related to higher levels of depression (Krause 
& Wulff, 2004), psychological distress (Krause, Ingersoll-Dayton, Ellison, & Wulff, 
1999), and lower levels of life satisfaction, self-esteem, and optimism (Krause, 2006).  
According to Hunsberger, Pratt, and Pancer (2001b) and Puffer et al. (2008), religious 
doubt may be an indicator that one is experiencing identity moratorium (i.e., seeking an 
identity but not having strongly committed to any identity status or label).  Perhaps the 
people who are located at the reduced mental health levels portion of the curvilinear 
relationship are experiencing identity moratorium.  In consideration that, in general, 
experiencing identity moratorium is associated with higher anxiety levels (Broderick & 
Blewitt, 2010), one would also expect to find lower levels of mental health.  There is also 
initial evidence that fluctuating religiousness levels are associated with having had been 
diagnosed with Generalized Anxiety Disorder and alcohol abuse/dependence (Maselko & 
Buka, 2008).  
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  Other research has found that when one’s beliefs are successfully challenged and 
cognitive dissonance is experienced higher levels of negative affect are frequently 
observed (Burris, Harmon-Jones, & Tarpley, 1997).  This finding by Burris et al. (1997) 
is relevant in that it is conceptually similar to the aforementioned studies that found lower 
strengths of beliefs predicting negative mental health consequences.  It is also relevant for 
the purpose of the current paper to note that cognitive styles have evidenced a 
relationship to whether one believes in God both correlationally and experimentally 
(Shenhav, Rand, & Green, 2011).  In light of these findings and the information described 
by previous theorists (e.g., Beck, 1976), there is evidence for an interrelationship between 
thinking styles and emotions, which in turn suggests that mental health has an 
interrelationship with one’s cognitions.  Thus, investigating the specific relationship 
between indicators of dogmatism, a cognitive style of its own, and mental health may 
further scientific understanding of protective factors or buffers against stress.   
 Unfortunately, when one looks beyond the previously mentioned studies that 
found a curvilinear effect there is little research on these in-between groups, such as 
agnostics or religious “nones,” because they are often combined with a nonreligious or 
atheist group within research samples.  Agnostics in particular may be undergoing doubt 
or moratorium experiences, which may partly explain lower levels of mental health 
because they lack the protective factor that is a dogmatic certainty or an orienting 
worldview that can buffer forms of stress.  This hypothesis is warranted, especially when 
one considers that one common definition of agnosticism (of several possible definitions) 
is being unsure or undecided about God’s existence (Zuckerman, 2009).  Zuckerman’s 
other definition of agnosticism, believing that the existence of God is one matter that is 
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beyond the scope of human comprehension, suggests that tolerating ambiguity about 
existential matters may result in negative mental health consequences, if one considers 
the research demonstrating the curvilinear effect.  Altogether, the evidence found thus far 
suggests that when one’s cognitive framework or belief systems are not well solidified 
that poorer mental health tends to co-occur among populations that are only slightly 
religious, fluctuating, or unsure.   
 Several attributes may potentially covary with dogmatism.  Richek et al. (1970) 
found that dogmatism’s relationship with mental health varied between genders with 
health benefits being evidenced in males only.  Right wing authoritarianism (RWA), a 
construct that is convergent with dogmatism and refers to a high degree of 
submissiveness to leaders and social norms as well as distaste for outsiders, was found to 
be more pronounced in older adults (Altemeyer, 1996).  Altemeyer also reported that 
RWA is inversely related to education level, but this effect is small.  These findings 
suggest that similar relationship directionalities may hold up when measuring dogmatism 
specifically.   
Other Explanations of Mental Health for the Religious and the Secular 
 Spirituality.   Scholars have struggled to define spirituality and resultantly there 
has been some difficulty identifying what these necessary ingredients of spirituality 
might be.  Gorusch (2002)  defined spirituality as “the quest for understanding ourselves 
in relationship to our view of ultimate reality, and to live in accordance with that 
understanding” (p.8).  Hood, Hill, and Spilka (2009) noted the complexity and confusion 
of the term spirituality and then vaguely defined it by mentioning several of its features 
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that distinguish it from religion:  spirituality is both personal and subjective, does not 
require an institutional framework or a deity, and is strongly informed by one’s 
commitment to values.  Spirituality is also more psychological while religion is more 
sociological.   
 Most of the information presented thus far has conceptualized results in terms of 
religiousness and nonreligiousness or religious and secular identities (e.g., atheists and 
agnostics), as the bulk of previous literature has tended to do.  Such terminology is 
confining and it is important to consider conceptual models that can inform future 
research and further theoretical advances.  One such work, Koenig (2008), summarized 
that historically in the psychology of religion and spirituality literature, religion was 
considered the supraordinate category while spirituality was considered the subordinate 
characteristic that was not necessarily shared by all who were religious.  The model 
entailed that religious and/or spiritual traits contribute to mental health.  Scholars often 
made conclusions regarding secularity and mental health’s relationship despite rarely 
including secular samples.   
 




Figure 2.  Previous scholarly understanding of the relationship between religion, 
spirituality, and secularity with mental health.  From “Concerns about measuring 
“spirituality” in research,” by H.G. Koenig, 2008, Journal of Nervous and Mental 
Disease, 196, p. 350.  Copyright 2008 by Lippincott Williams & Wilkins.  Reprinted with 
permission.     
 Koenig (2008) proceeded to discuss that more modern research reflects a different 
understanding in the way that spirituality and religion are described, as presented in 
Figure 3.  This modernized conceptual model reflects that the literature is now 
conceptualizing religion as a nonessential subcategory to one’s spirituality, and that 
secular groups may also be spiritual.  The noteworthy element of this conceptualization is 
that the religion and mental health connection has been found in previous literature not 
because religion is the essential and active mechanism that is associated with health, but 
that spirituality possesses the active ingredients that co-occur, even among those who 
possess secular identities.  Hood et al.’s (2009) descriptive features are congruent with 
   
 
15 
Koenig’s conceptualization that religion is a nonessential, but sometimes co-occurring 
element of spirituality.   
 
Figure 3.  Current scholarly depiction of the relationship between religion, spirituality, 
and secularity with mental health.  Note the overlapping conceptualization of spirituality 
with measures of mental health in the figure.  This reflects a methodological shortcoming 
in the scholarly literature that will be elaborated in a later section of the current paper.  
From “Concerns about measuring “spirituality” in research,” by H.G. Koenig, 2008, 
Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 196, p. 351.  Copyright 2008 by Lippincott 
Williams & Wilkins.  Reprinted with permission.      
 Components of spirituality.  There are several thematic elements in the complex 
construct of spirituality that have frequently appeared in various conceptual models of 
spirituality and in the creation of scales measuring spirituality.  Chiu, Emblen, Van 
Hofwegen, Sawatzky, and Meyerhoff’s (2004) literature search of over 70 qualifying 
articles found four major themes recurring frequently in the differing conceptualizations 
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of spirituality espoused by scholars:  existential reality; connectedness; transcendence; 
and power/force/energy.  Existential reality refers to a personal journey to discover 
meaning and purpose in one’s life.  The connectedness theme reflected relationships with 
other people communally, the environment, and a higher power.   Themes of 
transcendence typically denoted a capacity to attain new perspectives and experiences 
that were beyond physical reality.  The final theme found by Chiu et al. used terms such 
as power, force, or energy that represented a fueling motivation or compeller within an 
individual that was used to make significant life choices and engage in self-discovery.   
 Fisher’s (1998) own review of the spirituality literature not only led to similar 
thematic elements that reflect the spirituality literature and help define spirituality as a 
construct, but he also went a step further by creating a theoretical model that addressed 
how spirituality contributes to one’s overall health.   His description of spirituality is 
similar in scope to Chiu et al.’s (2004) findings, with only slight differences that allowed 
for describing the nature of the spirituality and health connection.  Most notably of these, 
Fisher (1998) argued that his four domains respective to his conceptual model build upon 
each other in order to instill a holistic level of health, a notion he referred to as 
“progressive synergism” (p. 28).  The initial domain, the personal domain, is a precursor 
for later spiritual experiences, and it includes aspects such as one’s sense of identity, 
meaningfulness, and purpose in life.  Being in this personal state of spiritual fulfillment 
allows one to beneficially experience deep interpersonal relationships with others and the 
community, referred to as the communal domain.  The environmental domain follows 
and the individual’s constitution incorporates a sense of respect for nature and being a 
steward for the environment at large.  Finally, the transcendental spiritual domain that 
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follows and is important in achieving a sense of wellness and health is the experiencing 
of a relationship with a force beyond humanity, which may include a healthy relationship 
to God, some ultimate concern that one values, or a cosmic power.  Fisher stated that the 
beneficial quality that one experiences in each of these four domains will vary throughout 
life due to the positive and negative circumstances that humans endure, but one’s health 
is enhanced by the synergism between each of these domains when each are experienced 
with greater quality.  As follows, one will undergo greater health, including mental 
health, if they value and are able to experience the tenets associated across the four 
domains of personal, communal, environmental, and transcendental.  Spiritual harmony is 
another facet of Fisher’s spiritual health model (Fisher & Brumley, 2006) that has 
implications for one’s well-being.  Spiritual harmony is the congruence between one’s 
personal definition of spiritual health and whether they are living up to that standard or 
not.  A person who has spiritual ideals and beliefs but does not live in accordance with 
those ideals would be in a state of lower spiritual harmony (i.e., spiritual dissonance), and 
it theoretically follows that the person would experience mental health consequences.   
 Evidence for spirituality and mental health connection.  Not only does the 
spirituality and mental health connection have a theoretical foundation, numerous studies 
have established empirical support that multiple facets and conceptualizations of the 
spirituality construct contribute favorably to one’s mental health (Barcus, 1999; 
Comptom, 2000; Coward, 1991; Fabricatore, Handal, & Fenzel, 2000; Fry, 2000; Genia, 
1996; Mofidi et al., 2007; Saxena, 2006; Tsuang et al., 2002; Veach & Chappel, 1992).  
The theoretical and empirical support coalesce to strongly suggest a positive and perhaps 
linear association between spirituality and mental health.   
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 When one also considers Koenig’s (2008) interpretation of the modern research 
literature that stated that spirituality is associated with mental health, a compelling 
argument is born that perhaps the spirituality and mental health relationship is what 
scholars have been describing all along even when they were using religious identity or 
religiousness as a variable in previous studies throughout the years.  Religiousness may 
have been acting as a proxy variable.  Restated, the last century of research demonstrating 
that religiousness contributes to one’s mental health may have actually been tapping into 
the spirituality and mental health connection instead which may explain previous findings 
and the linear nature of those findings.  Further, given the preponderance of null findings 
that evidenced non-statistically significant relationships between religiousness and mental 
health, such as the ones reviewed by Koenig et al. (2001), it becomes possible the 
methodologies employed by those studies were more situated to tap into religious 
elements that excluded components of spirituality, with the spiritual components being 
the actual essential ingredients responsible in the relationship with mental health.  This 
hypothesis is supported by the fact that, as discussed earlier, intrinsic religiousness 
(Ventis, 1995) and personal devotion in religiousness (Hackney & Sanders, 2003) show 
more consistently positive and larger effect sizes with mental health variables than other 
variables, such as extrinsic religiousness.  Of further note, both of these constructs, 
personal devotion and intrinsic religiousness, are conceptually overlapping with 
spirituality constructs if one consults the definitions presented by Hood et al. (2009) 
previously discussed.  As stated earlier, constructs such as extrinsic religiousness show 
weaker effects or more often indicate inverse relationships in regards to their association 
with mental health (Hackney & Sanders, 2003; Ventis, 1995).  Moreover, the extrinsic 
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religiousness construct is not overlapping and is conceptually different from spirituality 
constructs.  With these implications considered, the more capable a research study can 
incorporate spirituality constructs the more likely a positive and perhaps even linear 
association between spirituality and mental health will be evidenced.   
 Secular spirituality.  Other research has supported the proposed facets of 
spirituality in secular populations, such as atheists (Burkhardt, 1994; Stanard, Sandhu, & 
Painter, 2000), who presumably may derive psychological benefits often found associated 
with spirituality.  Burnard (1988) noted that atheists and agnostics actively searched for 
meaning in life and Hungelmann, Kenkel-Rossi, Klassen, and Stollenwork (1985) found 
that atheists and agnostics value interpersonal connectedness with others.  Both of those 
constructs are reflected in the spirituality themes and models of Fisher (1998) and Chiu et 
al. (2004), but these were indirect findings only suggesting at a secular spirituality.   
 In contrast to the indirect indication of spirituality described in Burnard’s (1988) 
and Hungelmann et al.’s (1985) questioning of secular populations, Chappel’s (1990) 
more explicit questioning of atheists and agnostics found that many members of these 
groups consider spirituality to be relevant in their lives.  Similarly, O’Connell and 
Skevington’s (2005) study found that Buddhists, Quakers, and Christians, as well as 
atheists and agnostics, all valued concepts of spiritual strength, meaning in life, and inner 
peace in similar magnitudes and regarded each facet as important for one’s quality of life.  
As a whole, these studies illustrated that spirituality can operate outside of religion and 
mirror Koenig’s interpretation of the research literature regarding the relationship of 
spirituality to mental health.  Chiu (2000) suggested that cross-cultural examinations 
could play a role in determining common elements of spirituality.  Perhaps examining the 
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spiritual elements considered by secular cultural groups can help expand on what 
spirituality means for diverse groups and alleviate some of the scholarly confusion 
surrounding the construct.       
 Coping strategies.  The relation between coping strategies and mental health has 
received substantial focus in the psychological literature.  One consensus that scholars 
currently accept is that there is no “magic bullet” coping strategy that attenuates stress 
uniformly in all situations across all types of people (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984).  
Different coping strategies may be effective or maladaptive for mental health outcomes 
depending on the context and person.  Nonetheless, Aldwin and Revenson (1987) noted 
that contextually less adaptive coping strategies tend to co-occur with poorer mental 
health and that coping strategies are sometimes causal explanations for such outcomes.  
Two main categorizations of coping strategies are emotion focused and problem/action 
focused coping.  Emotion focused coping refers to efforts aimed at modifying one’s 
reaction to a stressor, whereas problem/action focused coping reflects strategies aimed at 
modifying the actual cause of one’s stress.  One specific type of coping that does not 
cleanly fit into either of these categories are religious or spiritual coping strategies 
(Tamres, Janicki, & Hegelson, 2002). Religious and spiritual coping strategies deserve 
sufficient attention as they are sometimes seen to be the most frequent style of coping 
used (e.g., Conway, 1985-86) and used by large percentages of samples, sometimes 
between 80-90% (Ayele, Mulligan, Gheorigu, & Reyes-Ortiz; Koenig & Larson, 2001).  
With stressful circumstances affecting mental health, and with coping strategies at least 
partially moderating this relationship, it becomes relevant to investigate the roles of both 
   
 
21 
secular coping and religious/spiritual coping styles to better understand the overall 
relationship with mental health.   
 Religious and spiritual coping.  Religious and spiritual coping research has 
evolved throughout the years.  It typically focused on religious aspects in the primary and 
more spiritual aspects secondarily, if at all.  Early literature was limited in that it 
indirectly argued for religious coping’s positive effects by using indicators such as prayer 
frequency or church attendance to delineate contributions to mental health (e.g., Sherkat 
& Reed, 1992).  Later works discussed religious coping from a somewhat limited 
problem-solving coping style perspective (e.g., Pargament et al., 1988).  Pargament, 
Koenig, and Perez’s (2000)  more recent and comprehensive description of religious 
coping discuss it as having five functions, including some distinctly spiritual aspects, that 
are derivations from religion’s functions and go beyond just problem-solving 
implications of previous conceptualizations.  1) Religious coping can manifest as a 
cognitive framework that helps one find meaning, interpret, and understand baffling or 
stress inducing circumstances (e.g., believing that suffering a catastrophe was not a 
random act, but done with the purpose so that one would seek a stronger relationship with 
God in response).  2) Religious coping may include connecting spiritually with other 
people as well as a divine entity or cosmic force (e.g., praying to God to help others that 
are in need).  3) Religious coping can include acts or beliefs that provide spiritual comfort 
by reducing one’s apprehension to thrive in a mortal world and also encourage one to 
connect with a force that is beyond the physical world (e.g., seeking strength or support 
from God to help get through a difficult task).  4) Religious coping can provide a sense of 
control over  stressful situations (e.g., a victim of theft who finds comfort in the belief 
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that karma will punish an escaped thief).  5) Religious coping can guide one from living 
an unfulfilling lifestyle to one that has new spiritual values (e.g., dissatisfaction within a 
Christian’s life that encourages the Christian to live a more Biblically congruent 
lifestyle).  Despite the important contributions to the field, as a whole, the religious 
coping literature is limited in scope because it emphasizes the more confined notion of 
religion rather than the more comprehensive aspects that are spirituality.  Also, like the 
coping literature in general, religious coping literature is inherently limited to discussing 
reactions to stress.  To better understand mental health outcomes, emphasizing the roles 
of protectiveness and resiliency to stress are also important (Benard, 1991).   
 Religious and spiritual coping strategy research has evidenced favorable 
outcomes with many mental health variables, such as confidence, self-esteem, tension, 
and mood, (Pargament et al. 1990); personal growth (Lucero, 2010); boredom, social 
withdrawal, hopelessness, sadness, and restlessness (Koenig et al., 1995); psychological 
distress (Pargament et al., 1994); and adjustment to bereavement (McIntosh, Cohen 
Silver, & Wortman, 1993).  The results of Krägeloh, Pei Minn Chai, Shepherd, and 
Billington (2010) suggested that individuals with lower levels of spirituality and 
religiousness are more likely to use avoidant and escapist coping strategies that are 
typically maladaptive for one’s mental health while higher levels of spirituality and 
religiousness were associated with positive indications of health.  In this regard, 
accounting for levels of religiousness and spirituality may be important contextual 
determinants for dictating the relationship between religious and spiritual coping 
strategies and mental health.  With respect to the general strength of the effect of positive 
religious coping, Ano and Vasconcelles’ (2005) meta-analysis of 49 studies found that it 
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covaried with healthy psychological adjustment with a medium-strength effect size of Zr 
= .33.   
 Although religious and spiritual coping may be associated with better mental 
health outcomes, one might question whether the effect of these coping styles are 
redundant when other beneficial but purely secular coping mechanisms are in the picture.  
Numerous studies have shown that even though secular coping and religious coping often 
co-occur, they are not entirely redundant in regards to their relationship with mental 
health outcomes.  When the beneficial effects of secular coping are statistically controlled 
for, the advantageous effects of religious coping still remain with statistically significant 
strength for general psychological distress (Pargament et al., 1990), positive affect (Brant 
& Pargament, 1995, as cited in Pargament, 1997; Pargament et al., 1994), negative affect 
(Pargament, Smith, & Brant, 1995, as cited in Pargament, 1997) depression (VandeCreek 
et al., 2004), and anxiety (Vandecreek et al., 1995, as cited in Pargament, 1997). 
 Religious and spiritual coping may be additively effective beyond secular coping 
because it gives a sense of control in uncontrollable stressful situations (Siegel, 
Anderman, & Schrimshaw, 2001).  For example, invoking the support of or pleading with 
a higher power such as God may help alleviate personal distress because it creates the 
sense that the individual has countered and remedied the previously unalterable stressful 
problem to some degree by adding a level of control to the situation.  This phenomenon is 
reminiscent of the old adage “there are no atheists in foxholes.”  While secular coping 
mechanisms may be slightly more limited in usefulness in certain situations, religious and 
spiritual coping mechanisms may be perceived as unlimited in power by their users who 
believe in omnipotent sacred entities (Lucero, 2010).  Perhaps religious and spiritual 
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coping have an attractive benefit that purely secular coping cannot match, at least not 
entirely.  
 The relationship becomes less clear when one considers a smaller, but noteworthy 
group of studies.  Cederblad, Dahlin, Hagnell, and Hansson (1995) found that secular 
coping mechanisms were responsible for better mental health, better quality of life, less 
psychopathology, and less alcoholism while religious coping mechanisms were virtually 
not endorsed and nonessential for one’s better health.  This study suggested that secular 
coping can be advantageous and does not necessarily co-occur with religious coping 
despite religious coping sometimes demonstrating as the most popular method of coping 
(Conway, 1985-86).  Elsewhere, no mental health differences were found between 
secular and religious groups despite the religious participants showing a substantially 
large effect (η2 = .68) regarding their use of religious coping (Horning, Davis, Stirrat, and 
Cornwell, 2011).  Horning et al. is perhaps the only study of its kind that directly 
investigated religious and secular coping styles that actually included secular comparison 
groups.  The authors found very few differences between atheists, agnostics, high 
religiousness persons, and low religiousness persons.  There was a finding that atheists in 
particular, when compared to agnostics and religious participants, evidenced a small-
sized effect of being more likely to abuse substances to cope, but this effect did not 
achieve statistical significance.  Overall, the study found similar rates of secular coping 
styles, both adaptive and maladaptive, between religious and secular groups.  
  The relationship of religious coping with mental health also becomes slightly 
muddied by the findings that religious coping is not always a healthy act.  Pargament et 
al. (1998) showed that certain religious coping styles, such as becoming angry with God 
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or feeling punished by God, were associated with poorer mental health.  Koenig, 
Pargament, and Nielsen (1998) echoed these same findings that negative religious coping 
styles were associated with poorer mental health, but the authors also found that most 
negative religious coping behaviors were used rather infrequently.  In general, though, 
religious coping shares an advantageous relationship with one’s mental health.    
 Although a review of spiritual coping and not a study on its own, Baldacchino and 
Draper (2001) concluded that religious or secular identities were less relevant for 
determining one’s ability to cope but that maintaining a positive outlook was the crucial 
factor across people.  Wilkinson and Coleman (2010) found that strong ideological 
beliefs helped participants cope effectively through providing consolation and guidance 
regardless of whether those beliefs were religious or atheistic in nature.  One might 
wonder how an ideology like atheism that is essentially doctrine-less would help provide 
consolation and guidance.  As one 89 year old atheist participant in Wilkinson and 
Coleman’s study stated, “[…] what we’ve got here is the here and now.  Just make the 
best of it, do what we can and live peacefully with everybody that’s prepared to live 
peacefully with us.” (p. 350).   Coincidentally, one could argue that this atheist’s 
statement shares striking similarities to the basis of many religious faiths.  Other research 
has found that atheists and agnostics resembled their religious counterparts and had 
developed a code to live by that matched their own philosophical outlooks (O’Connel & 
Skevington, 2005).  A comprehensive look at this evidence suggests that distinguishing 
between religious or secular identities in isolation does not fully capture the phenomenon, 
as other factors, perhaps more cognitive in nature (e.g., ideological strength, attribution 
styles), are at play that are actively associated with mental health benefits and deficits.   
   
 
26 
 Religious and spiritual coping covariates.  Previous literature has found several 
attributes that tend to covary with religious and spiritual coping.  Women, older adults, 
and those with lower income tend to derive greater benefits from religious and spiritual 
coping than their respective counterparts (Pargament et al., 1990).  In regards to 
race/ethnic status, studies have indicated greater endorsements of religious and spiritual 
coping among African Americans in particular (e.g., Steffen, Hinderliter, Blumenthal, & 
Sherwood, 2001).  In contrast, the only demographic characteristic Pargament et al. 
(2000) found that accounted for a statistically significant amount of variance regarding 
whether one further benefitted from religious/spiritual coping or not was identifying as 
female.   
 Religious and spiritual coping strategies have not been directly compared with 
measures of dogmatism; however, some studies have examined religious 
fundamentalism, a specifically religious form of dogmatism, in conjunction with 
religious/spiritual coping.  Unfortunately for interpretive considerations, religious 
fundamentalism’s relationship with religious/spiritual coping is not clear cut.  For 
instance, Raiya, Pargament, Mahoney, and Trevino (2008) found that religious 
fundamentalism was moderately related to multiple forms of negative religious/spiritual 
coping styles (r = .39 to .42) but substantially less related (r = .11) to an indicator of 
positive religious/spiritual coping.  This particular finding is difficult to make sense of 
when previous research has found that both stronger belief systems and positive 
religious/spiritual coping are related to better mental health.   Based on previous findings, 
one would expect the Raiya et al. study to reveal a larger and positive correlation between 
fundamentalism and positive religious/spiritual coping with an inverse correlation 
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between religious fundamentalism and negative religious/spiritual coping.  In a separate 
study, participants considered to be religious fundamentalists were twice as likely to 
endorse positive religious/spiritual coping behaviors than negative ones (Nooney & 
Woodrum, 2002).  Further research exploring this relationship is warranted given the 
mixed observations.   
Dogmatism, Spirituality, and Coping:  Methods of Emotional Regulation 
 Dogmatism, spirituality, and coping are the constructs of interest for this study for 
two reasons.  First, within the field of psychology of religion and spirituality, these 
variables’ relationships to mental health are the most widely studied.  More importantly, 
these three variables can be understood from a single, but comprehensive theoretical 
framework:  emotional regulation.   
 Gross (2008) defined emotional regulation by describing the processes one uses to 
modify emotional states.  Typically the literature describes processes that are intrinsic in 
nature (i.e., what a person does to impact their own emotional state).  Emotional 
regulation also frequently refers to processes that are aimed at attenuating one’s own 
negative emotions, such as anger or sadness (Gross, Richards, & John, 2006).  
Conversely, emotional regulation can also take the form of maintaining or magnifying 
one’s positive emotions (Langston, 1994), such as joy or tranquility, but this appears less 
often.  In general, processes can take many forms, such as cognitive or behavioral 
strategies to modify one’s emotional state.  Cognitively, one might modify their 
disappointment after failing a test by mentally focusing on their positive qualities, 
assuring themselves that the test performance was a fluke, or converting the sadness to 
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anger by silently lambasting the professor’s actions (e.g., “The test questions were poorly 
worded!”).  In either example the participant was employing cognitive strategies to create 
a more preferable emotional experience, be that a more soothed state or as the latter 
example showcased, one negative emotion being endorsed because it was preferable to 
another emotion.   
 Behaviorally, one can also regulate and impact one’s emotions.  Receiving a 
coveted college acceptance letter in the mail may implore a high school senior to prolong 
their excitement by telling friends and family the good news who will then share and 
reciprocate the happiness, perhaps making the emotional high endure longer and with 
greater intensity within the student.  Bitterness within a recent divorcee may prompt an 
ex-husband to sue for full legal custody of the couple’s children as an attempt of turning 
the bitterness into a vengeful sense of triumph over his former wife.  While these 
examples consist of major events in one’s life, emotional regulation can more often be 
seen on a smaller scale in everyday life.  Examples include making small talk in an 
elevator to ease the awkwardness with another person, honking at the car in front of you 
that is reacting slowly to a changed traffic light as a means to ease an angry tension, or 
kissing one’s spouse upon returning home after a workday apart to quickly experience 
feelings of love and intimacy.   
 Emotional regulation can also be expanded to understand other major life choices 
beyond reactions to major stressors, everyday hassles, and everyday pleasantries.  One 
could argue that people make decisions, getting married, for example, because they 
expect some emotional reward, such as the enjoyment of shared intimacy or perhaps the 
sense of contentment derived from attaining the better financial security that marital 
   
 
29 
partnership can create.  In the same vein, why would a young graduate choose a career in 
one profession over another?  Arguably because the graduate had a belief that one of 
those professions would provide more net pleasure because it would result in more 
positive emotions and less negative emotions than the alternative career choice.  These 
examples are given because these same principles can apply to why one would adopt or 
maintain (perhaps subconsciously) a religious, spiritual, or secular identity.  Each of these 
identities provide an orienting worldview that can help one navigate the complexities of 
life via the respective identity’s inherent thinking styles and expected behaviors which 
impact emotional outcomes.  Religious doctrine guides how one should strive to think 
and act, and as described earlier, secular persons adopt their own philosophical outlook as 
a guide.   
 Finally, it is important to note that emotional regulation also affects one’s mental 
health.  Gross (2008) noted that maladaptive emotional responses are characteristic of 
more than half of Axis I disorders and all of the listed Axis II personality disorders listed 
in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000).  This finding holds that one’s quality of emotional regulation 
strategies affects facets of mental health, such as depressive symptomology or life 
satisfaction.   
 These general principles of emotional regulation can be applied to understand the 
roles of cognitive beliefs, like dogmatism, as well as the role of coping strategies and 
spirituality.  Each of these variables represent constructs that help one regulate their 
emotions and resultantly affect mental health.   
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 Coping.  Coping strategies have an obvious fit with emotional regulation, 
because, by definition, coping strategies are a response to a stressor.  Typically coping is 
defined as a response to a negative event and coping strategies are aimed at combating 
distress or regaining positive affect.  Coping strategies, then, primarily exclude facets of 
emotion regulation theories that describe how one increases or maintains positive 
emotions but are nonetheless clear indications of emotional regulation processes.   
 Dogmatism.  As defined earlier, dogmatism represents a certainty or strength of 
one’s beliefs.  It follows that one who is more certain in their belief style is more resistant 
to threats from situations or opposing worldviews that threaten the credibility of one’s 
own belief.  Higher levels of dogmatism may help buffer individuals from stress and 
reduce the occurrence of negative affect due to experiences like cognitive dissonance 
(Burris et al., 1997).  A person who chooses to strongly believe in their ideology may be 
effectively emotionally regulating and be less likely to experience psychological distress.  
This hypothesis is supported by the previous research discussed that found evidence for a 
curvilinear effect between strongly believing religious and secular groups with wavering 
belief systems being at a disadvantage.   
 One distinction regarding terminology that is important to note is theistic/atheistic 
certainty versus dogmatism.  Previous research that found support for a curvilinear effect 
with mental health (e.g., Galen & Kloet, 2010) demonstrated that one’s level of certainty 
in God’s existence or nonexistence produced a curvilinear relationship, while other 
studies demonstrated the same curvilinear effect by analyzing dogmatic strength levels.  
Methods of clarifying dogmatic strength levels varied across studies.   For example, Riley 
(2005) measured participants’ levels of certainty about general existential issues while 
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Ross (1990) had participants state their religious or secular identity and then rate that 
identity as being strong, somewhat strong, or not very strong.  Theistic/atheistic certainty 
can be considered a subtype of dogmatism specifically regarding God’s 
existence/nonexistence; however, dogmatism in its general form, is a broad characteristic 
that denotes the extent to which one is certain about their beliefs in general, regardless as 
to whether those beliefs deal with issues of theism, atheism, or something else entirely 
(e.g., political ideals).  It is this general form of dogmatism that theoretically contributes 
to resiliency against stress and thus may relate to better emotional regulation and 
healthier mental states; yet, no study to date has investigated whether dogmatism actually 
mediates the relationship between theistic/atheistic certainty and mental health.    
 Spirituality.  Spirituality has been linked with emotional regulation theories in 
the past, such as self-control theory (e.g., Ciarrocchi & Brelsford, 2009) and 
psychodynamic frameworks (e.g., Gostecnik, Repic, Cvetek, & Cvetek, 2009).  Another 
applicable emotional regulation perspective, terror management theory (TMT; 
Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1986), posits that humans are aware of their 
mortality and act or think in ways to compensate with their inevitable deaths.  TMT was 
formulated in part to explain existential belief patterns and behaviors and is unique when 
compared to other emotion regulation theories because its constitution provides a detailed 
interpretive lens for the functional roles that religion and spirituality play in one’s life.  
According to Vail et al. (2010), TMT states that religious and spiritual beliefs and actions 
provide one with a psychological security from the terrifying realism that death awaits us 
all.  As follows, spirituality and religiousness can be viewed as methods of emotionally 
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regulating and in turn may affect one’s mental health depending on the extent of their 
endorsement.   
 Both religious and spiritual ideologies beneficially regulate one’s negative 
emotions regarding death by providing what TMT theorists refer to as literal and 
symbolic immortality (Dechesne et al., 2003).  Religious perspectives often provide 
literal immortality by essentially saying, “follow this doctrine and you will live for 
eternity.”  Symbolic immortality refers to living on by being a part of something that is 
larger, important, and lasting beyond a single human’s lifespan.  This may be achieved 
through an ethnic or nationalistic identity that will endure among a group of people even 
after individual members perish but generations of living members persevere.  Symbolic 
immortality can also be achieved through the common tenets of spirituality.  Reflective of 
the Chiu et al. (2004) and Fisher (1998) spiritual models discussed earlier, spirituality 
involves a sense of connectedness or community that transcends the individual and lives 
on.  Spirituality, which may or may not include religiousness, can thus provide the 
adaptive emotional benefits of literal and/or symbolic immortality, which in turn may 
explain mental health differences among individuals.  Those who are in a state of 
spiritual fulfillment may experience better mental health outcomes, congruent with the 
spirituality and mental health empirical findings discussed previously.  Even secular 
forms of spirituality are likely to provide emotional regulation benefits because the 
secular person’s attunement with their spiritual motives of searching for meaning and 
purpose in life, living symbiotically with nature, and experiencing a deep connectedness 
and bond with humanity (along with many other forms of nonreligious spirituality) would 
likely positively affect one’s emotional valence.  Fulfillment of such spiritual motives 
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would reflect a secular person’s drive for symbolic immortality because these ventures 
are potentially impactful beyond the scope of the singular person’s life.   
 Spirituality differentiates itself as an emotional regulation agent from coping 
strategies in that spirituality can act as a remedy for negative emotions (similar to coping 
strategies) or as a maintainer/increaser of positive emotions (relatively an overlooked 
notion in the literature regarding coping strategies).  An example of the former includes 
being terminated from one’s job and responding by going on a hike in nature to 
experience the splendor and majesty of the environment that is spiritually revitalizing.  
An example of the latter is experiencing the blessing that is childbirth and giving thanks 
via prayer to a higher power or God for being bestowed with such a gift allowing one to 
bask even further in the delight.   
Methodological Issues and Considerations for Studying Religiousness and 
Spirituality  
 Sampling.  Hwang et al. (2009) discuss that it is a methodological weakness to 
not include secular control samples.  Producing research that compares high religiousness 
participants with lower religiousness participants is not the same as comparing a religious 
group with a secular group on mental health outcomes.  As an analogy, take the work of 
Gamst et al. (2002).  The authors found that low Latino ethnic identity levels among 
Latino Americans were related to poorer mental health.  Should one infer from this study 
that Caucasian Americans or Asian Americans conversely have lower mental health due 
to the likelihood of them also having low Latino identity levels? That would be an 
inaccurate overextension of the findings because Caucasian Americans or Asian 
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Americans have their own respective identities that may also be independently associated 
with mental health.  Likewise, secular identities should be considered separately from 
religious identities as they represent a different cultural group.   
 Another sampling issue inherent in the previous research that hampers the 
interpretation of the relationship between mental health and religiousness/spirituality is 
that this literature typically reflects Christian research samples.  Hood et al. (2009) 
reported that much of the psychological study of religion/spirituality is limited to those 
who identify as Christian.  Thus, the external validity is once again questionable and the 
proposed relationships extant within the literature should be considered with skepticism.  
It is possible that the relationships are limited to Christians themselves or that Christian 
practices in particular are responsible for the mental health associations observed thus far 
in the literature.  Such findings may or may not be robust when investigated with other 
religious groups.  Much can be learned by studying other groups with differing practices 
and belief systems, such as other religions or secular groups.    
 Hall, Koenig, and Meador (2008) went so far as to call secularity a “health 
liability” despite evidence that supports the contrary.  The authors also implied that 
secular persons and low religiousness persons are a fairly homogenous group.  Hall et al. 
have overlooked two things.  First, they have disregarded the implications of studies that 
were methodologically rigorous enough to use an adequate comparison sample of secular 
groups that found the curvilinear relationship detailed previously in this paper.  
Moreover, the authors failed to recognize that heterogeneity exists between secular 
groups and the less religious.  Hwang and colleagues (2009) noted this heterogeneity and 
criticized religion and mental health research for lumping together secular groups with 
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the less religious when analyzing data.  The characteristics of these less religious sample 
groups are typically ill defined and their characteristics are poorly measured (e.g., calling 
them religious “nones” or religious independents), and by comparing them to the highly 
religious is problematic because it does not provide a meaningful basis for comparison 
(Hwang et al., 2009).  The case for the heterogeneity of secularity in particular is 
supported by previous research, such as Hadaway (1989), whose cluster analysis revealed 
five differing groups within a sample of apostates who varied in socioeconomic status 
indicators, age, political values, family values, and, most notable for the current study, 
mental health and existential beliefs.  Future research should use indicators that allow for 
an observance of diversity within religious and secular groups in order to more accurately 
investigate the relationship with mental health variables.   
 Challenges measuring spirituality.  Another glaring issue that has pronounced 
itself in the last two decades concerns the studies that have compared spirituality with 
mental health variables.  Given spirituality’s idiosyncratic nature, finding a single 
measure whose definition encompasses a diversity of populations is difficult, and is 
perhaps part of the reason why scholars have argued that there is an oversupply of 
spirituality scales in the field (Kapuscinski & Masters, 2010).  While several scales are 
promising, numerous problems exist in many spirituality scale compositions that have 
been used in mental health research.  Western scholars often create scales that are 
particularly suited for Christian samples.  The Daily Spiritual Experience Scale 
(Underwood & Teresi, 2002), for example, frequently refers to “God” in its items, and 
thus may not be situated to measure spirituality levels in nontheistic spiritual persons.  
Another aspect that is debated by scholars is whether spirituality measures that include 
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the term spirituality should provide a definition of spirituality for the completers.  For 
example, the Beliefs and Values Scale (King et al., 2006)  aims to measure degree of 
spiritual beliefs and includes such items as “I am a spiritual person” and “At least once in 
my life, I have had an intense spiritual experience.”  What nature of spirituality these 
items are actually tapping across individuals is not obvious.  Echoing the construct 
validity concerns of Hwang et al. (2009), not clearly providing definitions of spirituality 
after using the term spirituality in an item makes it difficult to conclude that the 
researchers measured the same construct in participant A as they did with participant B 
even though their responses were identical.  In contrast, it can be argued that spirituality 
is idiosyncratic by nature, and by keeping the definition ambiguous the completer can 
make their own personally relevant interpretations regarding spiritual aspects in item 
content which may also be useful for researchers to study spirituality’s interrelationships 
with other variables. 
 Despite these debatable properties among scales, the salient issue that merits 
focus is that numerous spirituality scales being used overlap as measures of well-being.  
The most popular spiritual well-being scale, the Spiritual Well-being Scale (Paloutzian & 
Ellison, 1982), aims to measure existential and religious well-being.  Items include 
statements like “I feel that life is a positive experience” and “I feel very fulfilled and 
satisfied with life.”  As Koenig (2008) implied, these items could have just as easily 
ended up on questionnaires aiming to measure general psychological well-being and 
could be representative of a construct completely independent of spirituality.  Even after 
using a strict inclusion criteria for their review, de Jager Meezenbroeck et al. (2010) 
found that about half of the spirituality measures they collected contained items that 
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overlapped with psychological well-being.  These shortcomings in measuring spirituality 
taint the validity of previous researchers’ conclusions that spirituality is associated with 
mental health.  For the relationship with mental health to be accurately investigated, one 
must use a spirituality measure that is distinct from well-being and simultaneously able to 
encompass diverse groups.  
 Covariates.  There are other methodological factors that add to the complexity of 
investigating religiousness/spirituality and secularity’s relationships with mental health 
and merit discussion.  Covariates that may, in varying degrees, partly explain effects on 
mental health have also been given attention in the literature.  To regard the relationship 
between religion and mental health as a clear cut, linear connection would be an 
oversimplification as other influences may be present.   Koenig and Larson (2001) found 
that 90% of patients reported they used religion to cope with stress but a similar sample 
hailing from another geographic location found that only 55% of their patients responded 
with this same coping style (Ringdal, 1996).  Gee and Veevers (1990) discovered with 
their sample that the positive relationship between religious involvement and life 
satisfaction weakened or even reversed when geographic location was considered.  
Females, African Americans, and elderly persons in general tend to value religion more 
highly when compared to their cultural counterparts (Newport, 2006).  Further, these 
cultural attributes may alter the relationship between mental health and 
religiousness/spirituality.  For example, Crawford, Handal, and Weiner (1989) found that 
religiousness among females, but not for males, was positively related to life satisfaction 
and lower psychological distress.  Mirola (1999) echoed similar findings by 
demonstrating that religious involvement was negatively related to depression for females 
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but no such relationship was found for males.  Ellison (1991) found that life satisfaction 
was related to higher levels of certainty in one’s religious faith and this relationship was 
stronger among individuals with less formal education.  Overall, numerous cultural and 
social factors may partially filter the relationship between religiousness and mental 
health, and in turn these factors may affect the type of relationship that spirituality shares 
with mental health when one considers religiousness as a subcategory of spirituality.   
 Another covariate that must be parsed out to more fully clarify the relationship 
between mental health and religiousness/spirituality is the role of social support.  Greater 
levels of social support have been shown to associate with higher levels of mental health 
(Fiori & Denckla, 2012).  Additionally, it has been posited that associating with a 
religious group creates an environment where one is socially supported (Oman & Reed, 
1998).  Restated, associating regularly with a supportive group of people may serve as a 
protective factor against stressful or traumatic events, which may, in part, explain one’s 
mental health levels on its own.  Such findings add importance to distinguishing whether 
a positive effect on mental health exists specifically due to religious aspects or due to the 
beneficial nature of social support in general.  
 Unstudied interrelationships.  A final opportunity for exploration that has not 
yet been investigated thoroughly is the relative strength of effects with mental health 
among spirituality, coping styles, and dogmatism.  The research described thus far most 
often highlights just one of these variables’ relationship with mental health.  In contrast, 
simultaneous inclusion of all these variables in a statistical analysis can help pinpoint 
both the overlap and the unique effects that each of these variables may share with mental 
health.  It is possible that these variables may possess salient relationships in a univariate 
   
 
39 
context but this relationship may disappear when the variance of other variables is 
considered.  Simultaneously, a multivariate analysis could illustrate the size of the effects 
of these variables and clarify whether these effects possess strengths that are still relevant 
when other variables are also in consideration.      
 Taken together, the relationship between mental health and religion/spirituality is 
highly nuanced.  The manner in which mental health, religiousness, and spirituality are 
defined, as well as considerations regarding sample makeup, cultural factors, analytical 
strategies, and known covariates may also affect how relationships manifest, if at all.  
Research exploring these intricate phenomena would benefit from considering these 
issues in order to expand on the current scholarly discourse.   
The Current Study 
 Participants identifying as religious and secular were compared to investigate 
relationships between the variables of interest; namely, mental health, dogmatism, 
theistic/atheistic certainty, spiritual harmony, and religious/spiritual coping.  Mental 
health in the following hypotheses refers to the variables of positive affect, negative 
affect, life satisfaction, hope, gratitude, and altruism.  In testing the relationship between 
one’s belief strength with mental health, it was hypothesized that greater levels of 
theistic/atheistic certainty, regardless of the theistic or atheistic leaning, would positively 
predict levels of mental health (Hypothesis 1a).  Additionally, the participants with the 
strongest levels of theistic-oriented certainty and atheistic-oriented certainty (as denoted 
by the first item of this variable’s scale), would have similar levels of mental health 
(Hypothesis 1b).  Dogmatism was also hypothesized to mediate the relationship between 
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one’s theistic/atheistic certainty and mental health after controlling for educational level, 
gender, social support, and self-presentation bias (Hypothesis 1c).  Religious and spiritual 
coping styles were expected to account for significant amounts of the variance in mental 
health, with higher endorsements of religious and spiritual coping styles predicting 
greater mental health levels, for both participants who self-identify as religious 
(Hypothesis 2a) and secular (Hypothesis 2b) when controlling for the influences of 
gender, race/ethnicity, age, income level, geographic location, social support, and self-
presentation bias.  Spiritual harmony was hypothesized to account for significant amounts 
of the variance in mental health, with greater values of spiritual harmony predicting better 
mental health among both the religious participants (Hypothesis 3a) and those who 
identified as secular (Hypothesis 3b) after controlling for social support and self-
presentation bias.  
  It is important to clarify that Hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 1c used the theistic/atheistic 
certainty levels to clarify the strength and nature of one’s beliefs, while Hypotheses 2a, 
2b, 3a, and 3b, used each participant’s self-identified ideological affiliation that may be 
secular or religious in nature (e.g., agnosticism, Islam, etc.).  This distinction is necessary 
because the first set of hypotheses focused on strength of beliefs specifically while the 
second and third set of hypotheses investigated relationships via one’s self-ascribed 
religious or secular identity.  Also, this allowed for better interpretive possibilities 
because it separated belief strength from identity status.  For example, one could indicate 
high levels of theism on the theistic/atheistic certainty measure, but they may not be 
religious (e.g., people who identify as spiritual but not religious).  While there may have 
been overlaps between being theistic and also being religious, using the variables 
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separately allowed for more accurate testing of the hypotheses and prevented 
overextensions of the findings.   
 An exploratory research question with no formal hypothesis was also 
investigated.  What variables (i.e., dogmatism, theistic/atheistic certainty, 
religious/spiritual coping, or spiritual harmony) constitute the strongest and weakest 
predictors of mental health among participants, was also investigated.  While these 
variables have been studied separately regarding their relationship to mental health, no 
study had analyzed them simultaneously in a multivariate context to determine the 
relative strengths of their effects.  
  






 An online sample was recruited via contacting various special groups through 
community forums such as Facebook.com and Reddit.com.  Facebook group pages that 
were invited to participate included group pages devoted to agnosticism, atheism, 
Christianity, Islam, Judaism, and spirituality.  Group memberships ranged from 6,000 to 
30,000.  Reddit subforums receive random internet traffic, but each forum also has 
subscribers.  The subforums for agnosticism, atheism, Christianity, Islam, Judaism and 
spirituality were invited to participate and each subforum ranges from 1,500 to over one 
million subscribers.  A “snowball” component was also used so that these initial 
participants were encouraged to send the survey link to others they felt appropriate.  
Gosling, Vazire, Srivastave, & John (2004) found that online completion of self-report 
measures can produce consistent results with en vivo presentations and are apt at 
acquiring diverse sample memberships which helps ensure greater external validity.   
Measures 
 Theistic/Atheistic certainty.  Participants were asked to indicate how certain 
they were regarding God’s existence or nonexistence.  Strong theism is represented by 
those who endorse the statement “Absolutely certain God exists” (score of 3).  
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Subsequent possible responses were “Mostly certain God exists” (2), “Somewhat certain 
God exists” (1), “God’s existence or nonexistence is unknowable” (0), “I am unsure 
about whether God exists or not” (0), “Somewhat certain God does not exist” (-1) 
“Mostly certain God does not exist” (-2) and “Absolutely certain God does not exist” (-
3).  Dawkins (2006) theorized a similar metric, and Galen and Kloet (2010) also used a 
similar metric in their empirical study with analogous research questions to the current 
study.  One difference of the current theistic/atheistic certainty metric with Galen and 
Kloet’s is the inclusion of the option “God’s existence or nonexistence is unknowable” 
because this response reflects an additional type and definition that encompasses agnostic 
beliefs (Zuckerman, 2009) that is distinctive from those who are agnostic because they 
are doubtful.   
 This metric needed to serve as both a categorical indicator (i.e., are beliefs 
theistic, atheistic, or agnostic in nature) and as a continuous variable of belief certainty.  
To expand the theistic/atheistic certainty variable into a continuous form to study its 
linear relationship with other variables more clearly, three items were added.  
Measurements of the responses to the initial prompt “Regarding God’s existence OR 
nonexistence:  2) my beliefs are correct and represent truth; 3) I consider my beliefs to be 
strong; 4) there is nothing that could convince me differently” were gathered.  Agreement 
with these statements was indicated via an 8-point likert scale.  In sum, item 1 of the 
theistic/atheistic certainty scale assessed for both certainty levels (via the absolute value 
of the response score) and the ideological leaning, while items 2, 3, and 4 assessed for 
certainty levels only.  To create a composite scale with equally weighted items, the 0 to 3 
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absolute values of the first item were converted to an 8-point likert metric using the 
transformation procedure outlined by Dawes (2008).   
 Dogmatism.  Altemeyer’s (1996) DOG scale was used to measure dogmatism 
and is defined to measure “unchangeable, unjustified certainty” about the correctness of 
one’s beliefs regarding important general life matters.  There are 20 item responses 
reported in a 9-point Likert format.  An example item is “I am so sure I am right about 
the important things in life, there is no evidence that could convince me otherwise.”  
Altemeyer (1996) found that the scale had a Cronbach’s α of .90.  The scale’s strong 
predictive and construct validities have also been demonstrated in several studies 
(Altemeyer, 2002; Crowson, 2009; Crowson, DeBacker, & Davis, 2007).    
 Religious/Spiritual coping use.  Religious/spiritual coping use was measured by 
the religious/spirituality subscale from the Brief COPE (Carver, 1997), an abbreviated 
version of the COPE Inventory (Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989).  The 2 items 
consisted of statements asking participants to rate how frequently they enact certain 
religious/spiritual coping styles to deal with negative events via 4-point Likert response 
options.  A sample item includes “I try to find comfort in my religious or spiritual 
beliefs.”  The Brief COPE is frequently used in the coping literature and has also been 
used with a similar sample of secular and religious participants (Horning et al., 2011).  
Horning et al.’s study found α coefficients of .92 for this subscale.   
 Due to the brevity of the Brief COPE subscale, an additional subscale was used to 
increase the encapsulation of religious and spiritual coping styles and better understand 
their interrelationships with other variables.  Two of three items from the spiritual 
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connection subscale of the long form version of the Brief RCOPE (Pargament, 1999) 
were also used.  The third item of this subscale was excluded because it specifically uses 
the term “God” and thus would not be fitting for all participants.  The Brief RCOPE also 
uses a 4-point Likert response option that has participants rate the frequency they use a 
coping style.  A sample item includes “Thought about how my life is part of a larger 
spiritual force.”  Pargament et al. (2000) found that the three item version of the scale had 
an α coefficient of .81.   
 Spiritual harmony.  The Spiritual Health And Life Orientation Measure 
(SHALOM; Fisher, 2010) asks participants to rate 20 5-point Likert items twice each in 
response to two general questions (totaling 40 responses) that allow for a calculation of 
one’s spiritual harmony levels.  The first general question asks participants to rate 
whether each of the 20 items’ content (e.g., “Developing a personal relationship with the 
Divine/God”) is important for one’s spiritual health and the second general question asks 
the participant the extent that item’s content is actually being experienced by the 
participant.  This latter question regarding one’s lived experience comprises a separate 
scale has undergone research under the name of the Spiritual Well-Being Questionnaire 
(SWBQ; Gomez & Fisher, 2003).  The SHALOM measure (both general questions 
included) and SWBQ measure (lived experience question only) are directly based off 
Fisher’s (1998) spiritual health model and their 20 items reflect Fisher’s four domains of 
personal, communal, environmental, and transcendental spiritual health (five items per 
domain).  The SHALOM, used for the current study, is arguably more suitable for diverse 
populations when compared to other spirituality scales because its dual response system 
allows a person to essentially define their idea of spiritual health by rating whether they 
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agree that an item’s content is important for spiritual health and then rate how well they 
live up to their own standard of spiritual health.  Thereby the idiosyncrasies of each 
person are accounted for and issues such as the use of religious terminology (e.g., “God”) 
are bypassed because participants are not forced to endorse or disregard what they do not 
believe exists or is not pertinent.  A discrepancy score can then be calculated that reflects 
the disparity between one’s ideal state of spiritual health and their reported lived 
experience of spirituality (meaning a score of zero represents the highest level of spiritual 
harmony).  Thus, spiritual harmony is measured inversely, but for the purposes of this 
study the data was transformed with reverse coding to make the statistics more easily 
interpretable.  Fisher and Brumley (2006) suggested that a mean difference of 1.0 or 
greater between lived experience and spiritual health ideals for a given domain represents 
spiritual dissonance or lower spiritual harmony.  Restated, high levels of spiritual 
harmony mean the participants’ responses for each item were strongly similar between 
what they believe to be ideal for one’s spiritual health and whether they lived in 
accordance with that ideal.   
 The predecessor of the SHALOM measure that possesses identical content items, 
the SWBQ, has evidenced strong internal consistency (α  = .92), construct validity, 
convergent validity with other spirituality scales (r = .49), and a theoretically consistent 
factor structure (Gomez & Fisher, 2003).  Item response theory analyses have also 
yielded mostly favorable results but have isolated a select few items that would benefit 
from further improvement (Gomez & Fisher, 2005).  In a content review of several 
notable spirituality measures, including the Spiritual Transcendence Scale (Piedmont, 
1999) and the Spirituality Assessment Scale (Howden, 1992), de Jager Meezenbroek et 
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al. (2010) stated, “If one were to apply all our criteria, the Spiritual Well-being 
Questionnaire (SWBQ) of Gomez and Fisher (2003) proves most promising” (p. 14).  
Regarding the fulfillment of de Jager Meezenbroek et al.’s criteria, they elaborated that 
the SWBQ was suitable for religiously diverse populations because it does not exclude 
people based on their religious or nonreligious identity.  The authors also detailed that the 
SWBQ, despite its misleading name, only has one item that conceptually overlaps with a 
psychological well-being construct (“Developing joy in life”) which also means that the 
SHALOM measure as a whole is better equipped to tap into a spirituality construct that is 
largely distinct from psychological well-being.   
 A modification to this scale was made for the current study so that participants 
could respond with “Not Applicable.”  This change was necessary because no 
applicability is a meaningfully different response type than the current low anchor on the 
scale, “Very Low.”  This allowed for participants to differentiate whether the item’s 
content was actually reflective of their beliefs and actions and to what degree it was 
reflective.  It is also important to note that in the slightly infrequent case that a participant 
marked a spiritual ideal item lower than its correspondent lived experience item the 
discrepancy score was converted to 0 (to reflect that the person was actually still 
experiencing an optimal level of spiritual harmony for that item pair).  This was done to 
treat spiritual ideals as a threshold that one meets, and surpassing that threshold does not 
have negative consequences for one’s spiritual health, unlike falling short of meeting 
one’s spiritual ideal threshold, which would theoretically relate to negative consequences 
for one’s spiritual health.  Finally, minor modifications to the wording of the scale’s 
items and directions were made to uphold the intent of the original pencil and paper 
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format of the scale (the pencil and paper format used a side by side column format for the 
ideal and experiential corresponding items, which could not be replicated on the survey 
website).  The conversion from the physical format to the electronic survey format 
required that items be converted to complete sentences to make each item more readable 
and understandable to respondents.   
 Mental health.  Six scales were used to tap into multiple areas assessing mental 
health.  The Positive And Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1988) is a common measure used in psychological research to measure mood 
over a researcher’s chosen time frame (e.g., the past week, the past year).  The time frame 
chosen for the current study asked participants to rate their affect in the last month in 
order to capture an additional time frame separate from the other mental health measures 
used in the current study.  The PANAS is comprised of two scales of 10 words each that 
relate to either positive or negative affect and are endorsed on a 5-point Likert scale.  
Watson et al. found Cronbach’s α coefficients ranging from .84 to .88 across each scale 
for the multiple timeframes posed.  Expected convergent and discriminant validity 
directionalities with related mental health measures, such as the Beck Depression 
Inventory (BDI) were also found.  The BDI demonstrated a correlation of r=.58 with the 
negative affect scale and r=-.36 with the positive affect scale.    
 The Gratitude Questionnaire-6 (GQ-6; McCullough, Emmons, & Tsang, 2002) 
was used to measure one’s dispositional gratitude levels.  Six 7-point Likert style items 
ask participants to indicate the extent of their agreement with statements about one’s 
level of gratitude, appreciation, and thankfulness.  McCullough et al. found adequate 
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internal consistency (α = .82) and evidence for discriminant validity from other mental 
health variables.   
 The Hope Scale (Snyder et al., 1991) consists of 8 items that assess one’s 
perceived successful agency and the ability to pursue one’s goals.  A 4-point Likert scale 
is used to indicate the extent to which each statement describes the participant.   Snyder 
et al. found adequate internal consistency (α = .74-84), temporal stability (r = .73-.85), 
and evidence for convergent and discriminant validity.  Roesch and Vaughn (2006) also 
found that the scale’s factor structure was stable across diverse ethnic groups.   
 The Prosocialness Scale for Adults (PSA; Caprara, Steca, Zelli, & Capanna, 
2005) was used to measure an altruistic orientation among participants.   The 16 items 
tapped both behavioral and feelings associated with altruism and participants indicated 
how truthfully each statement described them through a 5-point Likert scale.  Caprara et 
al. noted that the PSA had previously evidenced strong psychometric qualities from a 
classical test theory perspective in previous research, and then went on to demonstrate 
that the PSA possessed strong discriminant and informative capabilities through item 
response theory procedures.    
 The final indicator of mental health was the Satisfaction With Life Scale (SWLS; 
Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985).  This five item scale is designed to assess 
one’s global sense of overall life satisfaction through its 7-point Likert rating system.  Its 
subjective nature is beneficial as it allows participants to rate their satisfaction based on 
their own criteria.  This scale has been used as an indicator of mental health in similar 
works to the current study (e.g., Galen & Kloet, 2010; Horning et al., 2010).  Pavot and 
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Diener (1993) found strong evidence supporting adequate reliability and validity, such as 
the scale’s temporal stability that maintained across two week (r=.83) and four year 
(r=.54) intervals and its discriminant validity that was found with other measures of 
mental health such as the BDI (r=-.72)   
 Social support.  A slightly modified version of the Social Support Questionnaire-
6 (SSQ6; Sarason, Sarason, Shearin, & Pearce, 1987) was used.  Six items were used to 
assess participants’ satisfaction with their social support system in regards to their 
supports’ acceptance, dependability, and ability to respond to one’s negative emotional 
states.  A total number of supports available was also asked.  Sarason et al. found that the 
SSQ6 correlated expectedly with mental health indicators (r=-.49 with a measure of 
loneliness) and possessed good internal reliability (α=.90 to .93).   
 Self-presentation bias.  Evidence exists that special groups may engage in 
socially desirable responding that can introduce error into data collection procedures 
(e.g., Presser & Stinson, 1998).  In regards to the current study, because anonymous 
completion of the measures would not prevent an omnipresent God figure from knowing 
a theistic person’s answers, socially desirable responding may occur in spite of the 
anonymous conditions.  Ballard’s (1992) Scale 1 short form version of the Marlowe-
Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) was used to assess for self-
presentation bias and socially desirable responding.  Loo and Loewn’s (2004) factor 
analytic procedures deemed Ballard’s version as an improvement over the original 
version but its internal reliability is lower than what is psychometrically desirable at 
α=.64.   
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 Religiousness and Spirituality.  Two separate questions asked questions to 
indicate on a 10-point Likert scale how religious they considered themselves and how 
spiritual they considered themselves, respectively.  These items were not used for 
hypothesis testing but were included to test whether other variables were related to these 
measures expectedly.   
 Demographic characteristics.  Due to the potential covariates described in 
multiple sections,  demographic characteristics that may also moderate relationships with 
mental health variables were also inquired:  geographic location, gender, race/ethnicity, 
age, education level, and income.   
Data Analyses 
 Pearson’s r correlations were calculated to analyze the predictive relationship 
strength between theistic/atheistic certainty (by using the absolute value of the response 
to item 1, in conjunction with the values of responses to items 2, 3, and 4 on the 
theistic/atheistic certainty scale) and mental health variables to investigate Hypothesis 1a.  
For Hypothesis 1b, participants who indicated on item 1 of the theistic/atheistic certainty 
scale the strongest levels of theism (scores of 3) or the strongest levels of atheism (scores 
of -3) will be compared in regards to their scores for each of the mental health variables 
via MANCOVA tests and Pillai’s trace statistics.  Demographic characteristics and other 
covariates (i.e., age, gender, geographic location, income, education level, social support, 
and self-presentation bias) that are statistically relevant contributors to theistic/atheistic 
certainty and mental health were included as the covariates in the analyses.  Pillai’s trace 
was used as it is considered to be more robust against departures from normally 
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distributed data (Field, 2006).  If significant differences were indicated, then follow up 
ANCOVA tests with Bonferroni adjustments were conducted to distinguish if specific 
differences existed by group membership.  Cohen’s d effect sizes (Cohen, 1988) were 
calculated to clarify the magnitude of group differences.    
 For Hypothesis 1c, structural equation modeling was used to test dogmatism’s 
mediating relationship between one’s level of theistic/atheistic beliefs (all four items 
including the absolute values of responses to item 1) and mental health.  Structural 
equation modeling allows for the estimation of both direct and indirect mediating effects 
and is useful for analyses that include latent constructs, such as mental health.  Model fit 
(for this hypothesis and all subsequent hypotheses and explorations) was assessed 
through the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), comparative fit Index (CFI), and root mean 
square error of approximation (RMSEA) tests.  RMSEA values less than .10 (Browne & 
Cudeck, 1993), along with its 90% confidence interval, and CFI and TLI values greater 
than .90 (Marsh, Hau, & Wen, 2004), were used to indicate anywhere from good to 
marginal model fit to the data.  Missing data were handled via multiple imputation 
methods.  Wayman (2003) argued that multiple imputation is superior to other forms of 
addressing missing data, such as mean imputation and case-wise deletion, that can 
sometimes bias results by introducing error.  The measurement model for the constructs 
was tested initially to ensure adequate fit for usage with the current and subsequent 
hypotheses testing.  As shown in Figure 4’s depiction of Hypothesis 1c, mediation was 
estimated by analyzing the path from the theistic/atheistic certainty variable to 
dogmatism, a path conducted from dogmatism to the mental health construct, as well as a 
direct path between theistic/atheistic certainty and the mental health construct.   




Figure 4.  Hypothesis 1c model.   
 For Hypotheses 2a,  and 2b, a multi-group analysis of a structural equation model 
was tested between religious participants and secular participants to determine whether a 
latent construct of religious/spiritual coping strategies predicted the latent construct of 
mental health, as shown in Figure 5.  A measurement model at the item level for 
religious/spiritual coping construct was tested initially to ensure adequate fit for the 
analyses.  To account for possible moderating effects described in previous works, 
gender, race/ethnicity, geographic location, the interaction between age and 
religious/spiritual coping, the interaction between income level and religious/spiritual 
coping were also included in the model.  Additionally, recruitment source was also used 
as a possible moderator to account for differences between users that were recruited 
through differing channels.   




Figure 5.  Hypotheses 2a and 2b model.   
 Hypotheses 3a and 3b were also tested through a multi-group structural equation 
model between religious and secular participants.  A causal path from spiritual harmony 
onto the latent construct of mental health was calculated.  Figure 6 illustrates this model.   
  
Figure 6.  Hypotheses 3a and 3b model.   
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 To answer the exploratory research question described earlier, the independent 
variables of dogmatism, religious/spiritual coping, spiritual harmony, and the full version 
of the theistic/atheistic certainty scale were used in a structural equation model to denote 
the relative predictive strengths for each of the variables onto the latent construct of 
mental health, as shown in Figure 7.    
  
Figure 7.  Exploratory research question model  
  





Sample and Recruitment 
 The internet recruitment strategy resulted in 7,538 respondents, 7,338 of whom 
gave consent.  Of those who gave consent, 4,667 (62%) were included in the final 
sample, which is the number reflected in each of the following tables unless otherwise 
noted.  The most common reason for exclusion were participants who gave consent but 
proceeded not to complete any or most of the questions that followed (n = 2,579, or 34% 
of the original respondent pool).  Other reasons that resulted in exclusion were indicating 
an age younger than 18 (n = 31, < 1%), failing to correctly respond to all of the validity 
check questions embedded within the survey (n = 58, < 1%), and submitting duplicate 
responses under the same IP address (n = 3, < 1%).   
 In regards to the final sample, the mean age was 27.4 (SD = 10.5), and ranged 
from 18 to 86 years of age.  The gender distribution favored those that identified as male, 
amounting to 60.7% (n = 2,831) of the sample, followed by females, who constituted 
28.4% (n = 1,327), with genderqueer participants, the third most numerous group, 
accounting for 1.1% (n = 52).  Intersex, questioning, transgender females, transgender 
males, and those who marked other, made up an additional 1.2% while non-responders to 
this question constituted the remaining 8.6% of the gender makeup.  Most participants 
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were recruited via group forums from Reddit.com (73%, n = 3,405), followed by 
Facebook.com (14%, n = 653).  Recruitment methods such as Craigslist, e-mail 
communication from a participant, and other internet sources comprised 4.6%, while the 
non-responders to this question made up the remaining 8.4%.  Table 1 provides 



















Additional Demographic Information 
Characteristic % N 
Race/Ethnicity 
Caucasian/White 78.2% 3,650 
Biracial/Multiracial 3.3% 154 
Asian 3.1% 143 
Hispanic/Latino/Latina 3.0% 141 
Other 3.9% 182 
Missing 8.5% 397 
Annual Income 
Less than $20,000 21.8% 1,018 
$20,000-29,999 10.8% 502 
$30,000-49,999 15.6% 728 
$50,000-74,999 15.2% 710 
$75,000-99,999 10.4% 484 
Greater than $100,000 16.8% 784 
Missing 9.4% 441 
Education Level 
Less than high school  1.4% 65 
High school 11.4% 530 
Some college 31.8% 1484 
Associate’s 5.9% 277 
Bachelor’s 27.4% 1,278 
Master’s 10.8% 506 
Doctoral 2.7% 127 
Missing 9.0% 400 
Geographic Location 
West U.S. 16.5% 768 
Midwest U.S. 16.1% 750 
Southwest U.S. 8.7% 407 
Southeast U.S. 12.3% 572 
Northeast U.S. 13.9% 650 
Not continental U.S. 16.5% 769 
Missing 16.1% 751 
Ideology 
Atheism 37.2% 1,738 
Agnosticism 19.8% 926 
Christianity 11.0% 514 
Spiritual, nonreligious 10.5% 489 
Buddhism 3.1% 146 
Judaism 1.2% 58 
Islam 0.6% 29 
Hindu 0.3% 15 
Other 7.9% 367 
Missing 8.2% 385 
Note.  Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.   




 The assumption of normality was assessed visually to ascertain whether the data 
was distributed normally. Visual checks were performed in lieu of traditional statistical 
tests because the large sample size hindered the interpretive capabilities of tests, such as 
calculating skewness and kurtosis values, as well as the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, which 
is prone to indicating non-normality in samples larger than n = 200 even when the data 
actually resembles a normal distribution (Field, 2009).  Visual inspection revealed that 
responses for each variable reflected normal distributions with two exceptions.  The 
religious/spiritual coping scale was positively skewed, indicating a generally low 
endorsement of these coping styles across the sample overall.  The gratitude scale was 
negatively skewed, indicating that a large portion of the sample tended to experience high 
levels of gratitude.  These variables, along with the others, were evaluated for normality 
violations at the group level since group comparisons were being made to test most of the 
aforementioned hypotheses.  Specifically, in accordance with Hypothesis 1b, the 
strongest theistically and atheistically certain group distributions were examined more 
closely as well as each religious and secular identity (for identities with at least n = 30 
because at this numerical threshold participant data is more likely to approximate a 
normal distribution; Field, 2009) because these identifiers would be pertinent for testing 
Hypotheses 2a, 2b, 3a, and 3b.   Further visual inspection revealed that the gratitude 
variable was negatively skewed across all religious and secular groups.  The 
religious/spiritual coping variable was positively skewed for only those who identified as 
atheist or agnostics, suggesting that it was these groups in particular that used these 
copings styles infrequently, which was consistent with conceptual expectations.    
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 In regards to homogeneity of variance, Levene’s test was too sensitive to be used 
informatively because of the sample size, and Hartley’s FMAX test was inappropriate due 
to the differences between group sample sizes.  Consequently, the residuals were visually 
inspected for patterns and those that were found to potentially violate this assumption 
were found to be consistent with theoretical expectations (e.g., participants who identified 
as agnostic showed narrower dispersion on the theistic/atheistic certainty scale as it had 
only two options that typified agnostic beliefs, while theists and atheists had at least three 
options that were applicable).  Square root, logarithmic, and reciprocal data 
transformations were explored but follow up testing evidenced that the transformed data 
created further anomalies (e.g., highly compressed variances) that tarnished the 
interpretability of subsequent group comparisons.   
 Outliers for each of the variables were identified through Tukey’s (1977) method 
with various conventional levels of g (i.e., g = 2.2, then subsequently tested at g = 3).  
Outliers identified by the method were temporarily removed from the data set to test 
whether they would impact statistical testing.   The removal of outliers using any level of 
g made no impact on the follow up testing so the outliers were reinserted into the data set.  
During a separate attempt to ascertain their impact, outliers were identified by 
determining scores beyond ±3 standard deviations from the mean.  They were each 
transformed to a value of  ±3 standard deviations but this method also proved to not make 
a practical difference in the follow up statistical tests that were done.  Taken together, 
transforming outliers identified by either of these approaches proved inconsequential in 
follow up testing.  As such, these changes to the dataset were reversed and the data as a 
whole were left untransformed in order to represent the participants’ actual responses.    
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 Multiple imputation was conducted in order to correct for missing values that 
occurred at random.  Missing values constituted 4.48% of the data set.  Following the 
suggestion of Bodner (2008), one imputation was create for each percentage of missing 
data, resulting in five imputed data sets that were used in the subsequent analyses.  In 
sum, not including the inserted values from multiple imputation, the data was left 
untransformed and reflected participants’ original responses.   
Hypothesis Testing 
 Tables 2 and 3 include information on the Pearson’s r correlations as well as the 
means and standard deviations of the measured variables.  Table 4 provides the reliability 
estimates of the scales used for the current study.  Table 5 provides the variable means 
separated by ideological affiliation for groups with at least 30 respondents.   
Table 2 
Correlations 
 TAC Dog. S. Sup. SPB SH Grat. L. Sat. Hope P. Aff. N. Aff. Alt. RSC 
TAC  .51** .06** .04** .16** .05** .09** .09** .12** -.08** .02 .03* 
Dog. .51**  .02 .07** .13** -.04* .07** .00 .03 -.09** -.05** .11** 
S. Sup. .06** .02  .13** .37** .46** .47** .34** .38** -.27** .26** .10** 
SPB .04** .07** .13**  .20** .14** .18** .18** .15** -.31** .22** -.02 
SH .16** .13** .37** .20**  .32** .41** .35** .40** -.32** .18** -.01 
Grat. .05** -.04* .46** .14** .32**  .56** .46** .47** -.22** .40** .22** 
L. Sat. .09** .07** .47** .18** .41** .56**  .55** .47** -.38** .19** .11** 
Hope .09** .00 .34** .18** .35** .46** .55**  .57** -.28** .33** .12** 
P. Aff. .12** .03 .38** .15** .40** .47** .47** .57**  -.12** .35** .15** 
N. Aff. -.08** -.09** -.27** -.31** -.32** -.22 ** -.38** -.28** -.12**  .03* .03* 
Alt. .02 -.05** .26** .22** .18** .40** .19** .33** .35** .03*  .23** 
RSC .03* .11** .10** -.016 -.01 .22** .11** .12** .15** .03* .23**  
Note.  TAC = Theistic/Atheistic Certainty; Dog. = Dogmatism; S. Sup. = Social Support 
Satisfaction; SPB = Self-Presentation Bias; SH = Spiritual Harmony; Grat. = Gratitude; 
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L. Sat. = Life Satisfaction;  P. Aff. = Positive Affect; N. Aff. = Negative Affect; Alt. = 
Altruism; RSC = Religious/Spiritual Coping.   
*p < .05, two-tailed.  **p < .01, two-tailed.   
Table 3 
Means and Standard Deviations 
Variable M (SD) Possible Range 
Theistic/Atheistic Certainty 5.07 (1.55) 1 to 7 
Dogmatism 3.09 (1.10) 1 to 9 
Social Support Satisfaction 3.62 (0.81) 1 to 5 
Self-Presentation Bias .41 (0.22) 0 to 1 
Spiritual Harmony -12.04 (8.68) -100 to 0 
Gratitude 5.67 (0.96) 1 to 7 
Life Satisfaction 4.34 (1.41) 1 to 7 
Hope 3.06 (0.46) 1 to 4 
Positive Affect 3.38 (0.76) 1 to 5 
Negative Affect 2.40 (0.84) 1 to 5 
Altruism 3.67 (0.68) 1 to 5 













Reliability Estimates of Scales 
Scale Cronbach’s α 
Theistic/Atheistic Certainty .73   
Dogmatism .87 
Social Support Satisfaction .89 
Self-Presentation Bias .70 
Gratitude .79 
Life Satisfaction .85 
Hope .83 
Positive Affect .88 
Negative Affect .89 
Altruism .91 









Note.  Scales with “(I)” and “(E)” at the end are referring to either the spiritual harmony 











Variable Means and Standard Deviations by Ideological Affiliation 
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Note.  TAC = Theistic/Atheistic Certainty; Dog. = Dogmatism; S. Sup. = Social Support 
Satisfaction; SPB = Self-Presentation Bias; SH = Spiritual Harmony; Grat. = Gratitude; 
L. Sat. = Life Satisfaction;  P. Aff. = Positive Affect; N. Aff. = Negative Affect; Alt. = 
Altruism; RSC = Religious/Spiritual Coping.   
 Hypothesis 1a.  This hypothesis posited that higher levels of theistic/atheistic 
certainty would positively predict mental health.  Partial support for this hypothesis was 
found while controlling for the variance contributed by social support satisfaction, 
income level, age, gender, recruitment channel, race/ethnicity, geographic region, and 
education level.  There was a statistically significant relationship between the 
theistic/atheistic certainty level with life satisfaction, pr = .06, p < .01(two-tailed); hope, 
pr = .05, p < .01(two-tailed); and positive affect, pr = .09, p < .01(two-tailed).  Each of 
these would be considered less than a small-sized effect as they did not meet the 
traditional cutoff of pr = .10 (Cohen, 1988).  The statistically nonsignificant results were 
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as follows:  gratitude, pr = .00, p = .83(two-tailed); negative affect, pr = -.03, p = 
.11(two-tailed); altruism, pr = .01, p = .77(two-tailed).   
 Hypothesis 1b.  Theistic and atheistic participants with the strongest levels of 
certainty (i.e., absolute certainty in God’s existence or nonexistence) were hypothesized 
to have similar levels of mental health.  Partial support was found for this hypothesis.  
The theistically certain participants (n = 355) were compared to the atheistically certain 
participants (n = 531) while controlling for the variance accounted for by social support 
satisfaction, income level, age, gender, recruitment channel, race/ethnicity, geographic 
region, and education level.  MANCOVA testing using Pillai’s trace revealed that there 
was a significant effect of certainty type on mental health, V = .040, F (6, 861) = 6.020, p 
< .001, partial η2 = .040.  Given the significant result, follow up ANCOVA tests were 
done for each of the six mental health variables with a Bonferroni adjustment threshold of 












Mental Health Variable Estimated Marginal Means and Standard Deviations by 
Certainty Type 
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Note.  Grat. = Gratitude; L. Sat. = Life Satisfaction;  P. Aff. = Positive Affect; N. Aff. = 
Negative Affect; Alt. = Altruism.   
 ANCOVA testing showed that there was a significant effect of certainty type on 
gratitude, F (1, 866) = 27.162, p < .001, partial η2 = .030, meaning that theistically certain 
participants had higher levels of gratitude.  The effect size difference between groups 
based on the estimated marginal means was .41d, a medium sized effect favoring the 
mental health of those who were absolutely certain God exists.  
 ANCOVA testing showed that there was not a significant effect of certainty type 
on life satisfaction, F (1, 866) = 3.906, p < .048, partial η2 = .004, meaning that 
theistically and atheistically certain participants had similar levels of life satisfaction.  
The effect size difference between groups based on the estimated marginal means was 
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.15d, a small sized effect favoring the mental health of those who were absolutely certain 
God exists. 
 ANCOVA testing showed that there was not a significant effect of certainty type 
on hope, F (1, 866) = .027, p = .869, partial η2 < .001, meaning that theistically and 
atheistically certain participants had similar levels of hope.  The effect size difference 
between groups based on their estimated marginal means was .04d,  which was not 
meaningfully different from zero.   
 ANCOVA testing showed that there was not a significant effect of certainty type 
on positive affect, F (1, 866) = 3.224, p = .073, partial η2 = .004, meaning that theistically 
and atheistically certain participants had similar levels of positive affect.  The effect size 
difference between groups based on the estimated marginal means was .07d, which was 
not meaningfully different from zero.   
   ANCOVA testing showed that there was not a significant effect of certainty type 
on negative affect, F (1, 866) = 3.239, p = .072, partial η2 = .004, meaning that 
theistically and atheistically certain participants had similar levels of negative affect.  The 
effect size difference between groups based on the estimated marginal means was .12d, 
which was a small sized effect favoring the mental health of those who were absolutely 
certain that God does not exist. 
 ANCOVA testing showed that there was not a significant effect of certainty type 
on altruism, F (1, 866) = 6.234, p = .013, partial η2 = .007, meaning that theistically and 
atheistically certain participants had similar levels of altruism.  The effect size difference 
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between groups based on the estimated marginal means was .25d, which was a small 
sized effect favoring the mental health of those who were absolutely certain God exists.   
 Testing Hypothesis 1b revealed  a mix of findings that supported or did not 
support expectations.  Theistically certain participants showed more favorable mental 
health levels based on effect size calculations for gratitude, life satisfaction, and altruism, 
with gratitude being the most prominent difference.  Atheistically certain participants 
showed more favorable mental health by having slightly lower levels of negative affect 
based on its effect size calculation.  The effect size calculations supported Hypothesis 1b 
in regards to the negligible differences found between groups for the hope and positive 
affect variables.  Based on the ANCOVA tests, life satisfaction, hope, positive affect, 
negative affect, and altruism were not statistically different between either group which 
supported Hypothesis 1b.  The statistically significant effect for higher gratitude levels 
among the theistically certain did not support Hypothesis 1b.  Overall, certainty type, be 
it theistic or atheistic in nature, ended up accounting for very little unique variance in the 
mental health variables when covariates were included in the model.  In sum, due to the 
multiple nonsignificant effects there was partial support for Hypothesis 1b that those who 
were absolutely certain in God’s existence or nonexistence had similar levels of mental 
health.  Figures 8 through 13 detail all 8 levels of theistic/atheistic certainty and 
approximations of their mean values for each mental health variable (excluding the 
influence of the covariates). 
 





Figure 8.  Certainty type with gratitude mean.   
 
 
Figure 9.  Certainty type with life satisfaction mean.   
 








Figure 11.  Certainty type with positive affect mean.   
 




Figure 12.  Certainty type with negative affect mean.   
 
 
Figure 13.  Certainty type with altruism mean.   
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 Hypothesis 1c.  This hypothesis posited that dogmatism would mediate the 
relationship between one’s theistic/atheistic certainty levels and mental health within a 
structural equation model.  A hybrid model was evaluated sequentially according to the 
procedures outlined by Anderson and Gerbing (1988) and Kenny (2011).  The initial 
measurement model indicated fit indices values of χ2 = 3,467.75, df = 151, p < .001 with 
a CFI of .858, a TLI of .821, and an RMSEA of .069 (with a 90% CI of .067-.071), 
evidencing a bad fit partly due to the altruism and negative affect indicators not loading 
on the mental health latent construct adequately.   Altruism had a standardized loading of 
.42 and negative affect had a loading of -.36, as compared to the loadings of .71, .74, .71, 
and .68 for hope, life satisfaction, gratitude, and positive affect, respectively.  Altruism 
and negative affect were removed from the model entirely because of the relatively weak 
loadings.  Theoretically this made sense in that altruism may not have been a strong 
indicator of one’s mental health because it focused on interpersonal behaviors that are 
socially adaptive as opposed to intrapersonal factors that typify one’s individual mental 
health state.  Negative affect may have emerged as theoretically distinct because it was 
the only construct associated with mental health that focused on negative aspects of 
mental health while all other indicators were positive indicators.  The removal of altruism 
and negative affect was not integral to the hypothesis testing, as they were only included 
with the intent to create a comprehensive and widespread mental health construct.  The 
remaining four variables still achieved this to a respectable degree.   
 The revised model resulted in an improvement in the fit indices, but the overall fit 
was still only marginal.  The indices were χ2 = 1,872.20, df = 116, p < .001 with a CFI of 
.914, a TLI of .886, and an RMSEA of .057 (with a 90% CI of .055-.059).  In order to 
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improve model fit further, the second modification included a removal of the sheaf and 
dummy variables along with their paths associated with the education variable.  The sheaf 
variable used for the educational levels was not significantly related to any variable in the 
model so all dummy variables along with the sheaf variable were removed in order to 
create a more parsimonious model.  The path from the education sheaf variable to 
theistic/atheistic certainty had a standardized regression weight of .023 and a p value of 
.357.  Education was only a control variable, and previous research had not consistently 
established a theoretical link between education level and variables like theistic/atheistic 
certainty, so its removal did not affect the theoretical underpinnings of the model.  The 
removal of education from the model resulted in the following indices that demonstrated 
an improvement in the model and an overall acceptable model fit.  The indices were χ2 = 
1,053.04, df = 50, p < .001 with a CFI of .926, a TLI of .903, and an RMSEA of .066 
(with a 90% CI of .062-.069).   
 Evaluation of unspecified paths revealed that self-presentation bias and 
satisfaction with social support were significantly correlated with each other, and age had 
a statistically significant relationship with the mental health construct.  These 
relationships were allowed to remain in the model.  While further refinements could have 
been made to the model to increase the fit even further, such changes would have only 
been empirically justifiable and not have been theoretically justifiable so modifications 
were ceased at this point.  The finalized recursive over-identified model, illustrated in 
Figure 14, had fit indices of χ2 = 952.71, df = 48, p < .001 with a CFI of .934, a TLI of 
.909, and an RMSEA of .064 (with a 90% CI of .060-.067).  Taken together, these fit 
indices evidenced an acceptable model fit to the data.  Table 7 lists the associated 
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regression estimates of the entire model.  A full mediation analysis was not conducted 
because while theistic/atheistic certainty was positively predictive of mental health and 
dogmatism, dogmatism was negatively related to mental health within the SEM model.  
Dogmatism’s relationship with mental health was contrary to expectation outright and so 
no support was found for Hypothesis 1c that dogmatism was mediating the relationship 
between theistic/atheistic certainty and mental health.    
Table 7 
Hypothesis 1c Regression Weights 
Path Standardized Unstandardized Error Critical Ratio p 
SPB  TAC .041 .344 .140 2.462 .014 
Age  TAC .151 .026 .003 9.082 < .001 
SPB  Dog. .036 .184 .066 2.776 .005 
TAC  Dog. .565 .346 .011 31.586 < .001 
Dog.  MH -.081 -.024 .005 -4.512 < .001 
S. Sup. MH .551 .222 .006 34.521 < .001 
SPB  MH .152 .229 .021 10.867 < .001 
TAC  MH .138 .025 .004 6.684 < .001 
Age  MH .067 .002 .000 4.790 < .001 
MH  P. Aff. .691 1.625 .040 41.020 < .001 
MH  Gratitude .705 2.087 .050 41.718 < .001 
MH  L. Sat. .754 3.273 .074 43.957 < .001 
MH  Hope .713 1.000 - - - 
TAC  TACitem1 .683 1.000 - - - 
TAC  TACitem2 .724 .783 .021 37.616 < .001 
TAC  TACitem3 .485 .519 .019 27.702 < .001 
TAC TACitem4 .669 .660 .018 35.981 < .001 
Note.  TAC = Theistic/Atheistic Certainty; Dog. = Dogmatism; S. Sup. = Social Support 
Satisfaction; SPB = Self-Presentation Bias; L. Sat. = Life Satisfaction;  P. Aff. = Positive 
Affect; MH = Mental Health. 




Figure 14.  Hypothesis 1c final model with standardized regression weights. 
Note.  TAC = Theistic/Atheistic Certainty; S. Supp. = Social Support Satisfaction; SPB = 
Self-Presentation Bias; MH = Mental Health. 
 The four item version of the theistic/atheistic certainty variable used in this study 
is a linear representation of a curvilinear effect detailed by Galen and Kloet (2010).  To 
explicably test a curvilinear effect in a manner more similar to Galen and Kloet, an 
additional model was created to test how one’s beliefs related to mental health.  Item 1 
from the theistic/atheistic certainty scale was entered into a model and was tested for a 
linear and a curvilinear relationship with mental health by inputting the raw value of Item 
1 (range of 3 to -3) and a squared value of Item 1 as two separate predictor variables into 
a structural equation model.  More specifically, the linear version of this variable 
considered higher levels of theistic beliefs as the greatest values with absolute certainty in 
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God’s existence equaling a value of 3, mostly certain in God’s existence equaling a value 
of 2, and somewhat certain in God’s existence equaling a value of 1.   Each progressive 
level of atheistic beliefs were lower in value with somewhat certain in God’s 
nonexistence equaling a value of -1, mostly certain in God’s existence equaling a value of 
-2, and absolute certainty in God’s nonexistence being the lowest possible value of -3.  
Agnostic beliefs were given a value of 0 for both forms of the variable so that this belief 
type could serve as a midpoint and as the lowest point for the linear form and curvilinear 
form of the variable, respectively.  The curvilinear form of this variable squared each of 
the linear values which consequently equated theistic beliefs and atheistic beliefs to 
similar values based on their certainty level (e.g., being absolutely certain in God’s 
existence or nonexistence would both result in a value of 9 for the curvilinear variable 
version).  These two variables were input into the model depicted below in Figure 15.  
The fit statistics for this model were χ2 = 849.989, df = 26, p < .001 with a CFI of .901, a 
TLI of .864, and an RMSEA of .082 (with a 90% CI of .078-.087), which collectively 
indicated a marginal model fit.  Model adjustments were not made because the intent was 
only to compare the linear and curvilinear forms of participant belief strength.  As Table 
8 indicates, both the linear variable and the curvilinear variable form were statistically 
significant predictors of mental health levels and both of these effects were small in 
regards to their strength.  The linear depiction of belief strength that valued theism higher 
had a standardized regression weight of .09, and the curvilinear depiction that valued 
either type of certainty level higher had a standardized regression weight of .10. 




Figure 15.  Linear and curvilinear comparison with standardized regression weights. 
Note.  TAC1_linear = Theistic/Atheistic Certainty item 1 linear version; 
TAC1_curvilinear = Theistic/Atheistic Certainty item 1 curvilinear version; S. Supp. = 











Linear and Curvilinear Comparison Regression Weights 
Path Standardized Unstandardized Error Critical Ratio p 
Linear  MH .090 .017 .003 6.553 < .001 
Curvilinear  MH .097 .010 .001 7.062 < .001 
S. Sup. MH .548 .219 .006 34.234 < .001 
SPB  MH .149 .223 .021 10.690 < .001 
Age  MH .058 .002 .000 4.214 < .001 
MH  P. Aff. .687 1.625 .040 40.568 < .001 
MH  Gratitude .707 2.105 .051 41.538 < .001 
MH  L. Sat. .754 3.290 .075 43.621 < .001 
MH  Hope .709 1.000 - - - 
Note.  Linear = Linear form of Theistic/Atheistic Certainty item 1; Curvilinear = 
Curvilinear from of Theistic/Atheistic Certainty item 1; S. Sup. = Social Support 
Satisfaction; SPB = Self-Presentation Bias; L. Sat. = Life Satisfaction;  P. Aff. = Positive 
Affect; MH = Mental Health. 
 Hypotheses 2a and 2b.  It was posited that religious/spiritual coping styles would 
be significantly predictive of mental health for both participants who identify as religious 
(Hypothesis 2a) as well as participants who identify as secular (Hypothesis 2b) while 
controlling for influences of gender, race/ethnicity, age, income level, geographic 
location, social support, and self-presentation bias.  Specifically, religious participants 
included Buddhists, Christians, Hindus, Muslims, and Jewish participants (n = 752) while 
secular participants included agnostics, atheists, and the spiritual but nonreligious 
participants (n = 3,153).   
 The same latent construct for mental health from the final model for Hypothesis 
1c was used for Hypotheses 2a and 2b.  For the current model, the covariates associated 
with race/ethnicity status caused the measurement model solutions to be inadmissible 
   
 
79 
when calculated.  The tests that followed found that the covariates of gender, recruitment 
channel, geographic location, age/coping interaction, income/coping interaction, had 
weak standardized regression weights (.08, .08, .03, .05, and .02, respectively) and caused 
poor model fit.  Each of these variables were sequentially removed.  The theoretically 
pertinent variables (i.e., religious/spiritual coping and its indicators as well as mental 
health and its indicators) along with the covariates of self-presentation bias, social 
support satisfaction, age, and income level remained after analyzing both the 
measurement and structural models.  The resultant over-identified recursive model for 
both groups combined was χ2 = 910.21, df =47, p < .001 with model fit statistics of CFI 
of .938, a TLI of .913, and an RMSEA of .069 (with a 90% CI of .065-.072).  Considered 
in conjunction, these fit indices suggested that the model was an acceptable fit to the data.  
Table 9 conveys the values of the estimates from the combined group final model while 
Figure 16 illustrates the final model used for both groups.   
Table 9 
Hypothesis 2a/2b Regression Weights for a Combined Religious and Secular Group 
Path Standardized Unstandardized Error Critical Ratio p 
RSC  MH .169 .061 .006 10.687 < .001 
Age  RSC .146 .013 .001 8.562 < .001 
S.Supp.  MH .537 .217 .007 31.822 < .001 
SPB  MH .161 .246 .023 10.891 < .001 
Inc.  MH .175 .032 .003 11.801 < .001 
RSC  RSCitem1 .865 1.000 - - - 
RSC  RSCitem2 .824 .921 .017 54.310 < .001 
RSC  RSCitem3 .578 .641 .018 36.576 < .001 
RSC  RSCitem4 .707 .829 .018 46.592 < .001 
MH  Hope .720 1.000 - - - 
MH  Gratitude .709 2.073 .053 39.003 < .001 
MH  L. Sat. .756 3.267 .080 41.070 < .001 
MH  P. Aff. .691 1.619 .042 38.168 < .001 
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Note.  S. Supp. = Social Support Satisfaction; SPB = Self-Presentation Bias; L. Sat. = 
Life Satisfaction;  P. Aff. = Positive Affect; MH = Mental Health; RSC = 
Religious/Spiritual Coping; Inc. = Income. 
 
 
Figure 16.  Hypotheses 2a/2b final combined group model with standardized regression 
weights.   
Note.  S. Supp. = Social Support Satisfaction; SPB = Self-Presentation Bias; MH = 
Mental Health; RSC = Religious/Spiritual Coping.   
 The standardized regression coefficient for the religious/spiritual coping construct 
onto the mental health construct was .26 for the religious participants and .14 for the 
secular group.  This indicated that religious/spiritual coping was positively predictive for 
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both religious and secular participants and these relationships would be considered 
between small to medium sized effects (based on Kline’s [1998] effect size metric where 
.1 to .2 is small, .3 to .4 is medium, and .5 or greater is considered large).  For the 
multiple group analysis, the unconstrained model’s values were χ2 = 890.69 (df = 94) and 
the fully constrained model’s values were χ2 = 973.86 (df = 105), leaving the chi-square 
difference test result at 83.17 (df = 11), p < .001, meaning that the models were not 
invariant.  In other words, the models as a whole were significantly different between 
religious and secular participants.  Follow up chi-square analyses for the model with the 
path from the religious/spiritual coping construct to the mental health construct 
constrained did not achieve statistical significance.  This model achieved a value of χ2 = 
891.52 (df = 95) which was below even the 90% confidence interval chi-square value of 
893.39 (df = 95) meaning that the two groups were not statistically different in regards to 
the effect of religious/spiritual coping onto mental health.  In light of these results, both 
Hypotheses 2a and 2b were supported in that religious/spiritual coping was a positive and 
significant predictor for both religious and secular participants, and religious/spiritual 
coping’s predictive strength was not significantly different between religious and secular 
participant groups.  Tables 10 and 11 detail the regression weights for the religious group 









Hypothesis 2a/2b Regression Weights for Religious Group 
Path Standardized Unstandardized Error Critical Ratio p 
RSC  MH .258 .080 .012 6.612 < .001 
Age  RSC .270 .019 .003 6.889 < .001 
S.Supp.  MH .538 .185 ..014 13.024 < .001 
SPB  MH .149 .190 .044 4.359 < .001 
Inc.  MH .107 .017 .005 3.197 = .001 
RSC  RSCitem1 .812 1.000 - - - 
RSC  RSCitem2 .820 .923 .047 19.496 < .001 
RSC  RSCitem3 .534 .628 .046 13.797 < .001 
RSC  RSCitem4 .557 .706 .049 14.406 < .001 
MH  Hope .644 1.000 - - - 
MH  Gratitude .725 2.373 .152 15.659 < .001 
MH  L. Sat. .725 3.637 .232 15.658 < .001 
MH  P. Aff. .710 1.852 .120 15.447 < .001 
Note.  S. Supp. = Social Support Satisfaction; SPB = Self-Presentation Bias; L. Sat. = 
Life Satisfaction;  P. Aff. = Positive Affect; MH = Mental Health; RSC = 













Hypothesis 2a/2b Regression Weights for Secular Group 
Path Standardized Unstandardized Error Critical Ratio p 
RSC  MH .135 .066 .009 7.550 < .001 
Age  RSC .035 .002 .001 1.772 .076 
S.Supp.  MH .535 .225 .008 28.888 < .001 
SPB  MH .164 .260 .026 9.964 < .001 
Inc.  MH .190 .035 .003 11.490 < .001 
RSC  RSCitem1 .816 1.000 - - - 
RSC  RSCitem2 .746 .950 .024 39.151 < .001 
RSC  RSCitem3 .565 .787 .026 29.834 < .001 
RSC  RSCitem4 .739 1.056 .027 38.856 < .001 
MH  Hope .737 1.000 - - - 
MH  Gratitude .702 1.984 .056 35.489 < .001 
MH  L. Sat. .761 3.181 .084 38.005 < .001 
MH  P. Aff. .688 1.573 .045 34.838 < .001 
Note.  S. Supp. = Social Support Satisfaction; SPB = Self-Presentation Bias; L. Sat. = 
Life Satisfaction;  P. Aff. = Positive Affect; MH = Mental Health; RSC = 
Religious/Spiritual Coping; Inc. = Income. 
  In consideration that the absence of statistically significant differences for the 
religious/spiritual coping effects between the secular and religious participants may have 
been due to the secular group including the spiritual nonreligious participants, an 
additional multiple group analysis was conducted that removed the spiritual nonreligious 
participants from the secular group and compared the remaining members (i.e., the 
atheists and agnostics) to the religious group.  For this multiple group analysis, the 
unconstrained model’s values were χ2 = 820.15 (df = 94) and the fully constrained 
model’s values were χ2 = 924.66 (df = 105), leaving the chi-square difference test result 
at 104.51 (df = 11), p < .001, meaning that the models were not invariant.  In other 
words, the models as a whole were significantly different between the religious group and 
the atheist/agnostic group.  Follow up chi-square analyses for the model with the path 
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from the religious/spiritual coping construct to the mental health construct constrained 
achieved a value of χ2 = 823.37 (df = 95) which was statistically significant at the 90% 
confidence interval threshold of χ2 = 822.86 (df = 95).  The standardized regression 
coefficient between religious/spiritual coping and mental health for the atheist/agnostic 
group was .08, compared to .26 for the religious group.  These results collectively 
indicated that atheists and agnostics in particular did not demonstrate as strong as a 
relationship between religious/spiritual coping and mental health as religious participants 
did.   Table 12 depicts the regression weights for the atheist/agnostic group.   
Table 12 
Hypothesis 2a/2b Regression Weights for the Atheist and Agnostic Group 
Path Standardized Unstandardized Error Critical Ratio p 
RSC  MH .078 .048 .012 3.900 < .001 
Age  RSC -.044 -.003 .001 -1.987 .047 
S.Supp.  MH .540 .225 .008 26.460 < .001 
SPB  MH .167 .261 .028 9.266 < .001 
Inc.  MH .188 .035 .003 10.383 < .001 
RSC  RSCitem1 .758 1.000 - - - 
RSC  RSCitem2 .698 1.033 .036 28.776 < .001 
RSC  RSCitem3 .511 .851 .038 22.516 < .001 
RSC  RSCitem4 .687 1.074 .038 28.557 < .001 
MH  Hope .731 1.000 - - - 
MH  Gratitude .696 1.995 .062 31.972 < .001 
MH  L. Sat. .758 3.205 .093 34.279 < .001 
MH  P. Aff. .679 1.562 .050 31.277 < .001 
Note.  S. Supp. = Social Support Satisfaction; SPB = Self-Presentation Bias; L. Sat. = 
Life Satisfaction;  P. Aff. = Positive Affect; MH = Mental Health; RSC = 
Religious/Spiritual Coping; Inc. = Income. 
 Hypotheses 3a and 3b.  These hypotheses posited that spiritual harmony would 
positively predict mental health levels among the religious participants (Hypothesis 3a) 
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and the secular participants (Hypothesis 3b) after controlling for social support and self-
presentation bias.  The same classifications of religious and secular groups from the 
initial Hypotheses 2a/2b analyses were used for this model.   
 Using the same latent construct structure for mental health as the previous 
models, the measurement model with both groups included was initially tested and 
indicated a mixture of acceptable and bad fit indices.  The values were χ2 = 868.056, df = 
33, p < .001 with model fit statistics of CFI of .926, a TLI of .877, and an RMSEA of 
.080 (with a 90% CI of .076-.085).  Further inspection indicated that the self-presentation 
bias variable had a weakly related regression weight of .09 onto the mental health 
construct and was removed because it was not originally included for theoretical reasons 
but only as a precaution for possible strong covariation effects.  This change resulted in 
the following over-identified recursive model of χ2 = 632.889, df = 25, p < .001 with 
model fit statistics of CFI of .945, a TLI of .901, and an RMSEA of .079 (with a 90% CI 
of .074-.084).  Overall, these fit indices suggested that the model was an acceptable fit to 
the data.  Table 13 conveys the values of the estimates from the combined group final 










Hypotheses 3a/3b Regression Weights for a Combined Religious and Secular Group 
Path Standardized Unstandardized Error Critical Ratio p 
SH  MH .526 .054 .002 23.966 < .001 
S.Supp.  MH .335 .136 .007 19.375 < .001 
SH  Pers. .846 1.000 - - - 
SH  Comm. .685 .613 .016 37.487 < .001 
SH  Env. .531 .424 .014 30.052 < .001 
SH  Tran. .210 .210 .018 11.916 < .001 
MH  Hope .720 1.000 - - - 
MH  Gratitude .695 2.032 .052 38.837 < .001 
MH  L. Sat. .760 3.285 .078 41.940 < .001 
MH  P. Aff. .708 1.658 .042 39.520 < .001 
Note.  S. Supp. = Social Support Satisfaction; SPB = Self-Presentation Bias; L. Sat. = 
Life Satisfaction;  P. Aff. = Positive Affect; MH = Mental Health; SH = Spiritual 
Harmony; Pers. = Personal Spiritual Harmony; Comm. = Communal Spiritual Harmony; 
Env. = Environmental Spiritual Harmony; Tran. = Transcendent Spiritual Harmony. 
 




Figure 17.  Hypotheses 3a/3b final combined group model with standardized regression 
weights.   
Note.  S. Supp. = Social Support Satisfaction; MH = Mental Health; SH = Spiritual 
Harmony.   
 The standardized regression coefficient for the spiritual harmony construct onto 
the mental health construct was .59 for the religious participants and .52 for the secular 
group.  This indicated that spiritual harmony had a large effect on mental health for both 
religious and secular participants.  For the multiple group analysis, the unconstrained 
model’s values were χ2 = 636.737 (df = 50) and the fully constrained model’s values were 
χ2 = 743.917 (df = 58), leaving the chi-square difference test result at 107.18 (df = 8), p < 
.001, meaning that the models were not invariant.  Restated, the models as a whole were 
significantly different between religious and secular participants.  Follow up chi-square 
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analyses for the model with the path from the spiritual harmony construct to the mental 
health construct constrained did not achieve statistical significance.  This model achieved 
a value of χ2 = 638.476 (df = 51) which was below even the 90% confidence interval chi-
square value of 639.44 (df = 51).  Given these results, both Hypotheses 3a and 3b were 
supported in that spiritual harmony was a significant predictor for both religious and 
secular participants, and the slightly stronger predictive strength for religious participants 
was not significantly different from the predictive strength for secular participants.  
Tables 14 and 15 list the regression weights specifically for the religious and secular 
group models, respectively.   
Table 14 
Hypotheses 3a/3b Regression Weights for the Religious Group 
Path Standardized Unstandardized      Error Critical Ratio p 
SH  MH .590 .049 .004 11.538 < .001 
S.Supp.  MH .296 .104 .014 7.565 < .001 
SH  Pers. .864 1.000 - - - 
SH  Comm. .684 .601 .033 18.406 < .001 
SH  Env. .580 .482 .031 15.459 < .001 
SH  Tran. .491 .547 .042 12.941 < .001 
MH  Hope .653 1.000 - - - 
MH  Gratitude .712 2.302 .144 16.040 < .001 
MH  L. Sat. .731 3.626 .222 16.367 < .001 
MH  P. Aff. .737 1.897 .115 16.453 < .001 
Note.  S. Supp. = Social Support Satisfaction; SPB = Self-Presentation Bias; L. Sat. = 
Life Satisfaction;  P. Aff. = Positive Affect; MH = Mental Health; SH = Spiritual 
Harmony; Pers. = Personal Spiritual Harmony; Comm. = Communal Spiritual Harmony; 
Env. = Environmental Spiritual Harmony; Tran. = Transcendent Spiritual Harmony. 
 




Hypotheses 3a/3b Regression Weights for the Secular Group 
Path Standardized Unstandardized   Error Critical Ratio p 
SH  MH .520 .056     .003 21.252 < .001 
S.Supp.  MH .338 .141     .008 17.570 < .001 
SH  Pers. .841 1.000     - - - 
SH  Comm. .685 .617     .019 32.843 < .001 
SH  Env. .519 .410     .016 26.010 < .001 
SH  Tran. .133 .123     .018 6.724 < .001 
MH  Hope .733 1.000     - - - 
MH  Gratitude .689 1.959     .056 35.155 < .001 
MH  L. Sat. .764 3.210     .083 38.497 < .001 
MH  P. Aff. .701 1.612     .045 35.715 < .001 
Note.  S. Supp. = Social Support Satisfaction; SPB = Self-Presentation Bias; L. Sat. = 
Life Satisfaction;  P. Aff. = Positive Affect; MH = Mental Health; SH = Spiritual 
Harmony; Pers. = Personal Spiritual Harmony; Comm. = Communal Spiritual Harmony; 
Env. = Environmental Spiritual Harmony; Tran. = Transcendent Spiritual Harmony. 
 In consideration that the absence of statistically significant differences for the 
spiritual harmony effects between the secular and religious participants may have been 
due to the secular group including the spiritual nonreligious participants, an additional 
multiple group analysis was conducted that removed the spiritual nonreligious 
participants from the secular group and compared the remaining members (i.e., the 
atheists and agnostics) to the religious group.  For this multiple group analysis, the 
unconstrained model’s values were χ2 = 539.938 (df = 50) and the fully constrained 
model’s values were χ2 = 654.12 (df = 105), leaving the chi-square difference test result 
at 114.182 (df = 8), p < .001, meaning that the models were not invariant.  In other 
words, the models as a whole were significantly different between the religious group and 
the atheist/agnostic group.  Follow up chi-square analyses for the model with the path 
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from the spiritual harmony construct to the mental health construct constrained achieved 
a value of χ2 = 541.267 (df = 51) which did not achieve statistical significance as it was 
below the 90% confidence interval threshold of χ2 = 542.64 (df = 51).  The standardized 
regression coefficient between spiritual harmony and mental health for the 
atheist/agnostic group was .51, compared to .59 for the religious group.  These results 
collectively indicated that atheists and agnostics in particular demonstrated a similar 
relationship between spiritual harmony and mental health just as the religious participants 
did.   Table 16 depicts the regression weights for the atheist/agnostic group.    
Table 16 
Hypotheses 3a/3b Regression Weights for the Atheist and Agnostic Group 
Path Standardized Unstandardized Error Critical Ratio p 
SH  MH .508 .053 .002 22.223 < .001 
S.Supp.  MH .348 .142 .009 16.689 < .001 
SH  Pers. .842 1.000 - - - 
SH  Comm. .672 .597 .020 29.595 < .001 
SH  Env. .506 .393 .017 23.247 < .001 
SH  Tran. .107 .097 .020 4.952 < .001 
MH  Hope .721 1.000 - - - 
MH  Gratitude .685 1.994 .063 31.819 < .001 
MH  L. Sat. .762 3.277 .094 34.949 < .001 
MH  P. Aff. .690 1.612 .050 32.035 < .001 
Note.  S. Supp. = Social Support Satisfaction; SPB = Self-Presentation Bias; L. Sat. = 
Life Satisfaction;  P. Aff. = Positive Affect; MH = Mental Health; SH = Spiritual 
Harmony; Pers. = Personal Spiritual Harmony; Comm. = Communal Spiritual Harmony; 
Env. = Environmental Spiritual Harmony; Tran. = Transcendent Spiritual Harmony. 
 Exploratory research question.  Similar to the evaluative steps of the previous 
hypotheses for the SEM models, the exploratory research question model was evaluated 
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sequentially.  Significant paths were retained from the measurement model and although 
the fit was not ideal, changes to the model were not made in order to keep all 
theoretically pertinent variables so that the research question could be addressed as 
intended (e.g., dogmatism was included in the model even though it was not significantly 
related or weakly predictive for several variables).  The satisfaction with social support 
variable was also included since this construct had evidenced in previous models that it 
was consistently and strongly covariant with mental health.  The final trimmed model is 
illustrated in Figure 18 with the regression weights displayed in Table 17.  The results for 
this over-identified recursive model were χ2 = 2,405.581, df = 124, p < .001 with model 
fit statistics of CFI of .916, a TLI of .884, and an RMSEA of .063 (with a 90% CI of 
.061-.065).  Consideration of the fit indices suggested that the model was only a marginal 
fit to the data.  This model was considered appropriate to at the very least explore the 
predictive strengths of each of the variables in a multivariate context.   
 Based on Kline’s (1998) effect size metric, only the standardized regression 
coefficient of spiritual harmony had a large effect on mental health.  The only medium 
sized effect was for the covariate of social support satisfaction.  All other effects from 
theistic/atheistic certainty, religious/spiritual coping, and dogmatism would be considered 
small in size.  Dogmatism was the only variable negatively predictive of mental health.  
This information suggested that spiritual harmony shared the strongest relationship with 
mental health when compared to any other variable used in this study.   
 




Figure 18.  Exploratory research question final model with standardized regression 
weights.   
Note.  S. Supp. = Social Support Satisfaction; MH = Mental Health; SH = Spiritual 










Exploratory Question Regression Weights 
Path Standardized Unstandardized Error Critical Ratio p 
SH  MH .508 .051 .002 25.197 <.001 
S.Supp.  MH .326 .131 .006 20.685 <.001 
Dog.  MH. -.145 -.043 .005 -8.662 <.001 
TAC  MH. .100 .018 .003 5.289 < .001 
RSC  MH. .151 .055 .005 10.689 < .001 
Note.  Indicators for latent constructs were excluded for brevity.  S. Supp. = Social 
Support Satisfaction; MH = Mental Health; SH = Spiritual Harmony; TAC = 
Theistic/Atheistic Certainty; RSC = Religious/Spiritual Coping; Dog. = Dogmatism.  
  





 A diverse sample of religious and secular ideological adherents were recruited via 
various internet communication channels and completed questionnaire data regarding 
their beliefs, coping patterns, spirituality, and mental health.  Specifically, one’s 
existential belief strength, general dogmatic thinking style, religious/spiritual coping 
behaviors, and spiritual harmony were measured then investigated both separately and 
conjunctively in order to determine how each of these variables related to one’s mental 
health levels.  The mental health variable included a composite of several variables 
comprised of the following measured constructs:  hope, positive affect, negative affect, 
gratitude, life satisfaction, and altruism.  The groups used in the study included sizable 
representations of atheist, agnostic, Buddhist, Christian, Jewish, and spiritual 
nonreligious respondents.  In particular, secular participants (agnostics, atheists, and the 
spiritual but nonreligious), a historically understudied but often speculated about group, 
made up the greatest portion of the 4,667 total sample.  This study not only contributed to 
the field due to its diverse and large sample, but also because it used multiple definitions 
of mental health and examined construct relationships through advanced statistical 
techniques, such as structural equation modeling.  Further, the measures of these 
constructs used in this study all evidenced acceptable psychometric properties and were 
more multiculturally applicable than previous studies because they were more consistent 
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with the ideologies of secular groups.  The current study explored how one’s certainty in 
God’s existence or nonexistence would relate to one’s mental health and general 
dogmatic thinking style.  This study also explored whether religious and secular 
participants experienced similar or differing effects in regard to how religious/spiritual 
coping and spiritually harmonious lifestyles associated with their mental health levels.   
Theistic/Atheistic Certainty and Dogmatism 
 Background.  Works such as Koenig et al. (2001) illustrated that numerous 
studies have found that as one’s religiousness increases so does one’s mental health.  
These relationships are moderated somewhat depending on the definitions of 
religiousness and mental health that are used, but overall the previous research has 
suggested a linear relationship between religiousness and mental health (i.e., as one 
increases, the other tends to also increase but not necessarily by an equal amount).  As 
such, social groups, such as secular persons, who by definition exhibit little to no 
religious characteristics would be expected to be less mentally healthy, just as previous 
works have argued (Schumaker, 1992).  In contrast, a smaller group of studies like Galen 
and Kloet (2010) have explored whether a curvilinear effect was more descriptive of the 
phenomena that affect one’s mental health.  In the context of studies similar to Galen and 
Kloet, the curvilinear effect refers to the idea that as one’s belief strength increases their 
mental health will also increase.  This effect could be considered curvilinear because it 
entails that one’s belief may gravitate towards a religious pole or a secular pole, but no 
matter the orientation of the belief as long as it is strong it would likely associate with 
more favorable mental health levels.  In other words, data from studies like Galen and 
Kloet have produced evidence that whether the beliefs of a person are religious or secular 
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in nature is not the vital mechanism that affects one’s mental health, but it is the strength 
of those beliefs that are the crucial component regarding the relationship with one’s 
mental health.  Moreover, one who has strong religious beliefs and one who has strong 
secular beliefs would be expected to have similar levels of mental health and would both 
be healthier than religious or secular persons with weaker beliefs.  The current study 
tested whether a linear relationship (i.e., as religious belief increases so does mental 
health) or a curvilinear relationship (i.e., as belief strength increases so does mental 
health) was more descriptive by having both religious and secular participants indicate 
their certainty levels in God’s existence.  The theistic/atheistic certainty construct in the 
current study measured the strength of one’s certainty regardless of whether it was 
theistically or atheistically based (strength levels were differentiated from each other by 
participants describing themselves as absolutely certain, mostly certain, and somewhat 
certain in God’s existence/nonexistence).  Participants with agnostic belief characteristics 
were measured as the least certain in regards to the theistic/atheistic certainty construct.   
 One speculation that the current study explored was whether theistic/atheistic 
certainty may be acting as an indicator or proxy variable for one’s general dogmatism 
level.  Dogmatism was defined in the current study as possessing an unjustified certainty 
and conviction that is resilient against opposing beliefs.  The salient difference between 
the dogmatism construct and theistic/atheistic certainty construct was that dogmatism was 
an indicator of one’s general thinking style while theistic/atheistic certainty was 
specifically focused on one’s beliefs about God’s existence.  If theistic/atheistic certainty 
was merely acting as proxy, then one would expect that dogmatism would be related to 
one’s mental health and might be an equally if not more effective predictor of the 
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relationship between beliefs and mental health.  In light of this possibility, participants 
also completed a measure that quantified their dogmatism levels.   
 Findings, Interpretations, and Future Research.  Hypothesis 1a posited that 
theistic/atheistic certainty levels would positively predict one’s mental health.  The data 
revealed that participants’ theistic/atheistic certainty levels showed weak but some 
statistically significant positive relationships with three of the six mental health variables.  
Although these effects were statistically apparent, they were not substantial enough to 
equate to a practically noticeable difference.  One’s certainty in God’s existence or 
nonexistence explained less than 1% of the variability in one’s life satisfaction, less than 
1% of the variability in hope, and about 1.4% of the variability in positive affect.  The 
magnitude of effects of belief certainty for the current study were similar to Galen and 
Kloet’s (2010) results which demonstrated that belief certainty explained 2% and 1% of 
the variability in participants’ life satisfaction and emotional stability, respectively.   
Theistic/Atheistic certainty levels for the current study did not evidence veritable effects 
on the other mental health variables of gratitude, negative affect, or altruism.   
 Hypothesis 1b posited that the participants with the strongest level of theistic 
certainty and those with the strongest level of atheistic certainty would have similar 
levels of mental health and partial support was found for this hypothesis.  Echoing the 
findings of Galen and Kloet (2010), the current study found that more theistically and 
atheistically certain participants (i.e., those who were absolutely certain in God’s 
existence/nonexistence) tended to have better levels of mental health than all of their 
counterparts who each were less certain about their beliefs.  The curvilinear relationship 
(coined by Galen and Kloet) was partially accurate at describing the relationship between 
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beliefs and mental health for the current study.  The current study suggested that while 
stronger certainty levels tended to equate to higher mental health levels, being devoid of 
certainty (i.e., having an agnostic belief type) was not as unhealthy as one would expect.  
In fact, participants who identified as agnostic because they believe God’s existence or 
nonexistence was unknowable frequently showed more favorable mental health values 
than participants who were somewhat certain about God’s existence or somewhat certain 
about God’s nonexistence.  Theoretically, perhaps a person who has determined that 
God’s existence is unknowable is no longer in a state of identity moratorium (i.e., trying 
to establish and discover a fitting personal identity).  The determination that the existence 
of God was unknowable may be also be characteristic of an established identity and this 
is one possible explanation of the better mental health (than what was theoretically 
expected) for this group.  In consideration that identity moratorium states tend to 
associate with higher levels of anxiety, it is plausible that people who marked that they 
were unsure or only somewhat certain about their belief type were potentially 
experiencing identity moratorium and would thus be experiencing an apparent decrease 
in their mental health.  Future studies could investigate whether identity moratorium 
states are observed among people with these belief patterns in particular because ego-
identity states were not measured in the current study.   
 In regard to the second agnostic belief type participant group, those who were 
agnostic because they were unsure about whether God exists or not, they showed more 
varied mental health levels in relation to the participants in both the somewhat certain in 
God’s existence or somewhat certain in God’s nonexistence groups.  Nonetheless, when 
both of these somewhat certain groups and both of the agnostic belief type groups were 
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considered together, the results supported the work of Krause and colleagues (e.g., 
Krause, 2006) because the findings indicated that higher levels of existential doubts 
related to lower levels of mental health.  Another avenue for future research is to not limit 
investigation to only using belief certainty as an indicator of belief strength.  It may be 
more illuminating to study effects on mental health by examining constructs like one’s 
ideological identity salience, or activism (e.g., Smith & Cimino, 2012) because while one 
might possess strong or weak levels of certainty this does not necessarily mean that their 
beliefs play a salient role in their life, which may be a pivotal distinction.  Whitley (2010) 
suggested that atheists can be more emphatic with their lack of belief and have differing 
salience and commitment levels regarding their secular identity.  Taking this into 
account, future research should consider studying atheist cultural subgroups (e.g., anti-
theists) in order to clarify the potential relationships of identity salience and activism with 
mental health.    
 Overall, the theistic/atheistic certainty investigation results suggested that the 
previous literature’s descriptions of religiousness’ or belief type’s relationship with 
mental health were too confined in their depiction.  The linear relationship of 
religiousness with mental health failed to account for the mental health benefits 
associated with being atheistically certain, and the curvilinear relationship descriptor did 
not account for agnostically believing participants to regularly display better mental 
health than the participants who possessed slightly higher levels of certainty, be it theistic 
or atheistic in nature, as evidenced by the mental health variable means for each specific 
group.  One finding that should be highlighted specifically is that the participants who 
were absolutely certain in God’s existence demonstrated higher levels of gratitude than 
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the participants who were absolutely certain in God’s nonexistence.  This finding 
supported the linear relationship hypothesis more than the curvilinear relationship 
hypothesis, but this finding did not manifest for all mental health variables and so it only 
provided limited support to a linear depiction.  The variability in gratitude levels was 
higher for the theistically absolutely certain participants than their atheistically absolutely 
certain counterparts by a margin of 3% after accounting for contributions from other 
variables (e.g., social support satisfaction).  One possible explanation is that gratitude 
may have been the only prominent mental health difference between religious and secular 
groups because the religious group was predominately Christian, and Christians in 
particular are instilled with the idea of being grateful especially in consideration of the 
grace demonstrated by Jesus Christ’s sacrifice allowing for their redemption.  Otherwise, 
the absolutely certain theist and atheist participants had similar levels of mental health 
overall.  In sum, when it came to general mental health differences between each of the 
atheist, theist, and agnostic belief type groups, both curvilinear and linear relationship 
depictions were limited in their ability to predict mental health levels.  A more apt 
descriptive term based on the current results might be that belief type and certainty levels 
shared a multi-curvilinear relationship with one’s mental health.  At the very least, the 
current study demonstrated that existential belief types and certainty shared a complex 
relationship with mental health. 
 Hypothesis 1c posited that dogmatism would mediate the positive predictive 
relationship between theistic/atheistic certainty and mental health.  No support was found 
for this hypothesis.  As expected, dogmatism was strongly related to one’s 
theistic/atheistic certainty levels.  Contrary to expectations, dogmatism was not positively 
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predictive of mental health when a composite mental health variable was created that 
included all six of the mental health variables in the study.  The lack of a positive 
relationship between dogmatism and mental health was contrary to the results of the 
Rokeach (1960) and the Richek et al. (1970) studies that found greater dogmatism was 
related to less psychopathology.  With the current study’s results in mind, dogmatism was 
not found to be the explanatory and mediating variable for the positive relationship 
between theistic/atheistic certainty and mental health.  Dogmatism possessed a mixture of 
relationships with the mental health variables when looked at individually.  Dogmatism 
associated with greater mental health when considering it was positively predictive of life 
satisfaction and negatively predictive of negative affect, but dogmatism was negatively 
related to mental health when considering its negatively predictive relationship with 
gratitude and altruism.  It possessed no significant relationships with positive affect or 
hope.  No matter the direction of the relationship, whenever an effect was evident for 
dogmatism on any of these mental health variables it was weak in magnitude.   
 In respect to the negative relationship between dogmatism and a composite 
variable of mental health, along with theistic/atheistic certainty’s positive relationship 
with mental health, a complex picture emerges regarding the emotional regulation 
theoretical perspective.  Emotion regulation theory (Gross, 2006) explains that as one 
interacts with stimuli in their environment emotional experiences result and the person 
will consequently act in ways to experience a preferred emotional state (e.g., a person 
who had a stressful day at work takes the initiative to relax when they get home).  It was 
originally expected that theistic/atheistic certainty and dogmatism would both associate 
with greater levels of mental health because each would play a role in preserving more 
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preferred or positive emotional states.  Dogmatism’s negative impact and 
theistic/atheistic certainty’s positive impact on mental health were both weak effects and 
may not play a meaningful role with one’s mental health.  Dogmatism, based on its 
definitional component of a resiliency against opposing beliefs, was expected to prevent 
distress because it would prevent instances of cognitive dissonance which can lead to 
distress.  This expectation was merited given previous works like Burris et al. (1997) that 
demonstrated that cognitive dissonance (i.e., the discomfort resulting from the 
simultaneous experience of two contradictory pieces of information) and negative affect 
can both be reduced when one appeals to their religious beliefs.  Perhaps the absence of 
this relationship in the current study was more indicative of the temporary nature of the 
distress that cognitive dissonance creates.  The Burris et al. study experimentally 
observed brief effects of dissonance, whereas the current study was trying to capture the 
beneficial buffer that dogmatism possessed against dissonance and the subsequent 
distress from a more stable, personality-based standpoint.  Perhaps future research could 
verify whether dogmatism acts as a buffer in short-term experimental settings to distress 
only.   
 With the small effects of dogmatism on mental health being negatively predictive 
for the current study, it was possible that specific components of the dogmatism construct 
may have contributed to that relationship.  Altemeyer (1996) found that dogmatism was 
strongly related to right wing authoritarianism, which definitionally includes a distaste for 
those who possess opposing beliefs.  This weak but negative relationship between 
dogmatism and mental health may be due to dogmatic persons being more likely to be 
distressed by contact with people or communications that express ideological differences; 
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however, even this explanation cannot account for the complex relationship patterns that 
emerged between dogmatism and each of the six mental health variables.  Follow up 
testing will be necessary to more clearly understand the relationship of dogmatism with 
mental health.   
 Unlike dogmatism, theistic/atheistic certainty levels and their relationship with 
mental health was consistent with the emotional regulation framework as hypothesized.  
From an emotional regulation theoretical perspective, it was anticipated that higher 
certainty levels would indicate one’s resilience against instances of cognitive dissonance 
that occur in everyday life, similar to dogmatism, and subsequently act as a buffer against 
distress from the environment’s presentation of stimuli that might contradict one’s 
existential worldview.  Moreover, a person with such strong resiliency would experience 
negatively impactful emotions less and their mental health state would be more favorable 
in the long term.  The current study’s findings were partially congruent with this 
theoretical perspective; however, the magnitude was not as strong as expected and a 
statistically veritable relationship did not exist for each of the mental health variables 
individually.  Such a small and inconsistent effect suggested that theistic/atheistic 
certainty levels may not be the crucial ingredient that associates with greater mental 
health.  What was notable based on the current study’s results was that theistic/atheistic 
certainty, despite being strongly related to dogmatism, affected mental health levels in an 
opposite fashion than dogmatism.  This demonstrated that while having resilient beliefs 
in general (i.e., being dogmatic) was not necessarily beneficial to one’s mental health, 
having resilient beliefs specifically pertaining to existential matters (i.e., being 
theistically/atheistically certain) was mildly important in light of the limited strength of 
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the association between theistic/atheistic certainty and mental health.  Possibly, the 
differential effect between dogmatism and theistic/atheistic certainty was that that 
theistic/atheistic certainty in particular helps one come to terms with mortality.  
Theistically certain participants are more likely to believe that they will join their deity 
when they perish, while atheistically certain participants have been compelled to come to 
terms with the idea that they have one life to live and their only option is to make the 
most of it.  The only limitation of this perspective is that is does not account for why 
those participants that believed God’s existence or nonexistence was unknowable tended 
to have slightly greater mental health levels than the theists and atheists who were only 
somewhat certain about God’s existence or nonexistence.  Perhaps this difference was 
due to the reasons posited earlier, in that participants who have decided God’s existence 
or nonexistence is unknowable have resolved their identity moratorium and are no longer 
experiencing heightened levels of anxious searching for a belief that fits them.   
 Limitations and Additional Implications.  A few limitations were inherent with 
the measurement of theistic/atheistic certainty.  A small group of secular participants 
provided the same feedback that they disliked that the theistic/atheistic certainty measure 
sometimes used the word “belief.”  These participants noted that the tenets of atheism can 
only be considered a belief in a colloquial sense, and that to say something does not exist, 
such as God, does not qualify as a specific belief on its own.  Referring to atheistic tenets 
as a belief suggested that atheists have their own kind of “faith” tantamount with theistic 
faith, which these secular participants felt was not considerate of the atheistic perspective 
that God is a construct that was never logically created via evidential proof and that it is 
incoherent to have a belief in a construct that was irrationally conceived and has never 
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existed.  Additionally, secular participants as well as non-monotheistic religious 
participants commented that the use of the term God was problematic for them 
specifically because God was not clearly defined and the implied Judeo-Christian 
conception of God was not applicable to all participants.   Use of terms that were 
inclusive of polytheistic, deistic, and pantheistic perspectives would have been more 
appropriate.  Future research devoted to scale development could help create more 
refined measures that encompass the diversity of ideologies between participants to more 
accurately account for how certainty type relates to other constructs.   
 As posited by Ross (1990), determining the strength of beliefs is important when 
investigating a relationship with mental health and limiting descriptions to only the 
ideological label of a sample obscures the interpretability of research.  The emergent 
implication of the results of the current study was that researchers need to consider the 
heterogeneity of religious and secular groups, and that blanket statements tend to simplify 
complex relationships that can occur between mental health and the array of possible 
ideological affiliations of which participants might identify.  For example, Hall et al. 
(2008) made the declaration that secularity is a health liability and that differentiating 
between religious and secular identities could potentially help aid medical decision 
making.  Schumaker (1992) preceded Hall et al. by declaring that being nonreligious was 
bad for one’s health.  Based on the current study, the Hall et al. and Schumaker assertions 
were potentially incorrect and at the very least they were large overstatements based on 
the current findings.  More studies should consider Hwang et al.’s (2009) argument that 
combining secular groups with low religiousness groups is problematic for interpretative 
considerations and that studies that did, such as Pollner (1989), potentially made 
   
 
106 
erroneous conclusions.  A maxim of multiculturally considerate research is that within-
group variability of traits (e.g., mental health) concurrently exist alongside between group 
variability (see Costigan, Bardina, Cauce, & Kim, 2006; Sevig, Highlen, & Adams, 2000) 
and researchers should account for such variability within the hierarchical group labels 
when interpreting data.  With the current study showing that the agnostics (specifically, 
those who indicated they were agnostic because they were unsure) and the weakly 
affirming atheistic and theistic participants tended to have the lowest mental health 
levels, using one’s religious or secular identity status to partly contribute to making 
medical decisions, as Hall et al. suggested, would be unwise.  However, members of the 
helping professions should be vigilant for people whose ideologies are more affected by 
doubt due to the potential mental health disparity they experience when compared to 
other ideological perspectives.  Culturally informed treatments, such as multiculturally 
informed psychotherapy and spiritually integrated psychotherapy (e.g., Aten & Leach, 
2009) could be infused with helping services to meet the mental health needs of these 
populations.   
Religious/Spiritual Coping 
 Background.  Religious/spiritual coping strategies have been studied numerous 
times in regards to how they relate to mental health (Pargament, 1997).  As the meta-
analysis of Ano and Vasconcelles (2005) has evidenced, the effects of religious/spiritual 
coping on mental health are consistently positive.  Previous research has limited itself to 
primarily studying Christians using these religious or spiritual coping strategies.  Coping 
strategies that double as both religious and/or spiritual have not been isolated from the 
extant findings as previous studies have tended to use a combination of both the strictly 
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religious coping mechanisms in conjunction with those that could be seen as 
simultaneously religious and spiritual.  With these limitations of previous studies in mind, 
there is a need to investigate spiritual coping strategies that are not limited to religious 
traditions and are not only enacted by religious adherents.   Instead, investigating whether 
these coping mechanisms also hold a beneficial relationship to mental health among 
populations that are not religious could foster new insights about healthy living.  Previous 
research has shown that secular populations value spirituality (O’Connel & Skevington, 
2005), thus it is plausible that secular populations might also be receiving mental health 
benefits from spiritual coping mechanisms.        
 Findings, Interpretations, and Future Research.  A second set of hypotheses 
posited that religious participants who reported using religious/spiritual coping strategies 
would also have better mental health (Hypothesis 2a) and that secular participants who 
used religious/spiritual coping strategies would similarly experience better mental health 
(Hypothesis 2b).  A multiculturally considerate measure of coping that could 
simultaneously be applied to both religious and secular participants was used to 
investigate the relationship between religious/spiritual coping and mental health.  As 
expected, higher levels of religious/spiritual coping were related to greater mental health 
for both groups which supported both Hypothesis 2a and 2b.  The strength of this effect 
was not statistically different between groups and the magnitude of this effect would be 
considered between small to medium for both religious and secular participants.  A 
notable finding from the religious/spiritual coping analyses was the evidence that secular 
participants were also using religious/spiritual coping and from a correlational standpoint 
these coping behaviors appeared to associate with more favorable mental health levels.  
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Horning et al. (2011) found that religious coping was used in differing amounts between 
religious and secular participants and the current study confirmed those findings by also 
finding that religious adherents used religious/spiritual coping more frequently.  The 
current study’s religious/spiritual coping scale allowed for a possible mean value between 
1 and 4.  Atheists’ mean value was 1.39, and agnostics’ mean value was 1.65, which were 
both lower than the religious groups that ranged from values of 2.15 for the Jewish 
participants and 2.67 for the Christian participants.  If one were to transform Horning et 
al.’s coping measure to a 1 to 4 scale like the current study’s, the mean values for 
religious coping would be 1.10 for atheists, 1.21 for agnostics, 2.53 for a low 
religiousness group, and 3.52 for a high religiousness group.  Comparatively, the coping 
trends were similar between the current study and Horning et al.’s study despite the use 
of different measures and somewhat different group distinctions.  Notwithstanding the 
different coping frequencies between groups for the current study, the data evidenced that 
religious/spiritual coping was beneficially related to mental health for both religious and 
secular groups; however, religious participants evidenced more of a beneficial 
relationship between religious/spiritual coping and mental health than atheists and 
agnostics did specifically.  Overall, the support for a positive effect between 
religious/spiritual coping and mental health added to the prevailing results of numerous 
previous studies that also identified the same positive relationship (e.g., Koenig et al., 
1995), but the current study’s results are unique due to the inclusion of multiple secular 
groups.   
 As expected, the beneficial use of religious/spiritual coping strategies to counter 
stressful stimuli supported an emotional regulation theoretical perspective.  Based on the 
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items that make up the religious/spiritual coping scale, this meant that both religious and 
secular participants who more frequently prayed or meditated, purposely sought comfort 
from their religious or spiritual ideals, connected spiritually with others, or focused on 
their life being part of a larger spiritual force achieved more emotional regulation benefits 
that presumably helped their mental health state when faced with a stressful experience.  
What these activities specifically looked like for each ideological group is unclear and the 
magnitude of effects of this relationship varied in strength among each ideological group 
as well.  For example, how a Buddhist participant found comfort in their beliefs was not 
articulated and whether they experienced the same magnitude of benefits of using 
religious/spiritual coping strategies with other groups was not explored in the current 
study.  Likewise, when an agnostic person coped by connecting spiritually with others it 
may have looked different from how the Christian participant meant they spiritually 
connected with others in response to stress and whether this coping method impacted 
their mental health to the same extent was not investigated.  Regardless of these 
subjective differences, there was initial evidence in the data that spiritual coping practices 
in general helped one combat stress by potentially helping them focus on each of their 
spiritual proclivities that allowed for transcending beyond the difficulties that humans 
face every day.   
 Wilkinson and Coleman (2010) felt that the crucial factor for a person to cope 
effectively was having a strong ideological belief system, be it religious or secular in 
nature.  The current study did not test for a moderating effect between belief strength and 
coping, but this study did show that religious/spiritual coping behaviors were uniquely 
predictive of mental health levels even when one’s strong beliefs (i.e., theistic/atheistic 
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certainty) were considered.  This finding suggested that both the use of religious/spiritual 
coping behaviors used in response to stressful situations and the strength of one’s belief 
each played a unique, albeit small, role in affecting one’s mental health.   
 Limitations and Additional Implications.  A limitation of only using 
religious/spiritual coping items that focused on positive reactions to stress is that it 
excluded the potential negative effects that sometimes occur from particular 
religious/spiritual coping strategies.  Pargament et al. (1998) stated that negative religious 
coping strategies (e.g., being angry at God for a life stressor), despite being used less 
often than positive religious coping strategies, tended to associate with poorer mental 
health levels.  The items on the religious/spiritual coping measure only tapped into the 
relationship of positive religious/spiritual coping specifically.  There is a need for 
religious/spiritual coping measures that look at a broader variety of coping responses 
types, be they positive or negative, while at the same time not limiting themselves to 
coping that narrowly reflects only Christian, theistic, or monotheistic worldviews.   
Additionally, qualitative investigations could be useful to illuminate how the different 
ideological adherents used these coping strategies.  The items of the current quantitative 
measure were necessarily vague in order to maintain applicability to the diverse 
populations being questioned, but future research that allows participants to describe their 
coping experiences with greater personalized detail could shed light on how each group 
specifically used their spirituality to cope with stressful contexts.   
Spiritual Harmony 
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 Background.  Koenig (2008) described that in the past social science commonly 
considered that spirituality was a subcategory subsumed by religion.  As theoretical 
understandings evolved, Koenig detailed that more recent literature tends to consider the 
relationship between these two constructs oppositely, wherein religion has become a 
subcategory subsumed by spirituality.   Extending from the evolution of the terms 
religion and spirituality, it is presently understood that one can be spiritual without 
necessarily being religious, which entails that groups such as secular people may also 
endorse their own unique spiritual lifestyle.   
 Fisher (1998) reviewed numerous works within the psychological literature and 
found that spirituality frequently possesses four component domains.  The personal 
domain is described as having a sense of identity, pursuing ventures that one findings 
meaningful, and achieving one’s purpose in life.  The communal domain consists of 
experiencing rich interpersonal relationships with others.  Possessing a reverence for 
nature and one’s surroundings entails the third domain, the environmental domain.  The 
final domain, the transcendent domain, is comprised of experiencing a relationship with a 
force, perhaps supernatural, such as God or a higher power.  Fisher contended that a 
spiritual health contributes to one’s overall health and past literature has produced 
empirical evidence on numerous occasions that greater levels of spirituality in one’s life 
beneficially impacts one’s mental health in particular (e.g., Mofidi et al., 2007).  Fisher 
would specifically define the term spiritual harmony as the extent that one fulfills their 
spiritual ideals.  For example, one might believe that an important component of their 
personalized form of spirituality might be to worship a higher power, but if such a person 
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rarely engaged in this worship then they would be experiencing little spiritual harmony in 
this specific area of their spiritual life.    
 A major limitation of previous works was that they frequently used measures of 
spirituality that suffered from construct validity issues (i.e., whether they truly separated 
the measurement of spirituality and mental health from each other is debatable), and 
many of these studies used spirituality measures that reflected Judeo-Christian doctrines 
(e.g., Underwood & Teresi, 2002) and were thus not necessarily appropriate for use with 
secular persons or adherents to religious ideologies outside of the Abrahamic religions.  
The current study used a spiritual harmony measure that was applicable to a wider 
diversity of ideologies with the purpose of exploring whether spiritual harmony was 
related to one’s mental health for both religious and secular participants.   
 Findings, Interpretations, and Future Research.  Perhaps the most notable 
finding of the current study was the relationship between spiritual harmony and mental 
health.  Hypotheses 3a and 3b speculated that for religious and secular persons spiritual 
harmony would be positively related to their mental health, respectively.  Spiritual 
harmony was measured by having participants quantify their level of beliefs across an 
assortment of spiritual concepts to indicate whether they were important for their spiritual 
health or not, and then quantify the extent their actual behaviors adhered to those beliefs 
based on the level they endorsed them.  By analyzing the discrepancy between one’s 
spiritual health ideals and their actual spiritual behaviors their spiritual harmony became 
apparent.  Importantly, it was found that this spiritual harmony construct had the 
strongest effect, a large effect, on one’s mental health.  The strength of this association 
was more prominent than any other variable measured in this study:  income, education, 
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age, religious/spiritual coping, theistic/atheistic certainty, and even social support 
satisfaction.  Social support satisfaction was the variable that was most predictive of 
one’s mental health with a medium to large sized effect in every analysis until spiritual 
harmony was included in the multivariate models, which itself then became the 
frontrunner in the positive predictive relationship by a substantial margin over any other 
variable because spiritual harmony remained the only large sized effect in the final 
exploratory model (social support satisfaction downgraded to a medium sized effect 
when spiritual harmony was introduced in the models).   
 What else was remarkable about this finding with spiritual harmony was that this 
large effect on mental health was evident for both religious and secular participants.  The 
magnitude of this effect was found to be similar between both the religious and secular 
participants as well, suggesting that spiritual harmony is a relevant predictor regardless of 
what individual elements consist within a person’s ideology and belief tenets.  Granted, 
the spiritual harmony construct had differently weighted components for religious 
participants versus secular participants (i.e., a different inclusion of transcendent spiritual 
practices), but nonetheless this general notion of being in a state of living up to one’s 
spiritual ideals came out as prominently related to one’s mental health.  Based on the 
factor loadings between groups, it was evident that secular participants had a noticeably 
different depiction of the role that transcendent spirituality (e.g., developing a 
relationship with a higher power) had in their life than the religious participants did, but 
the idea of living in a consistent way with one’s spiritual health values was the crucial 
factor underlying the relationship as a whole.  The results of this study suggested that 
people can hold a diversity of beliefs, but the content of those beliefs may be somewhat 
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arbitrary as it relates to impacting one’s mental health.  Perhaps what is important for 
one’s health is how a person lives up to those beliefs in their day to day life.  This 
relationship was a substantial finding that has never been demonstrated this clearly in 
previous religious and spirituality literature with diverse samples.  
 Given this large effect, spiritual harmony was potentially the most effective 
determinant of emotional regulation compared to all the other predictor variables in this 
study.  Outperforming religious/spiritual coping as well as belief strength constructs, 
spiritual harmony emerged as the condition that was most predictive of healthier 
emotional regulation.  Possible explanations for this effect were that spiritual harmony 
was a more precise indicator of more adaptive responses to a person’s underlying death 
anxiety, if one were to consider a terror management theoretical (TMT) perspective.  
TMT describes the stimuli and reactions that surround one’s emotional conflict that one 
experiences when they are aware of their inevitable demise.  As Vail et al. (2010) 
detailed in their discussion of TMT, engaging in spiritual or religious actions provides 
one with a sense of security or psychological appeasement from the unease that 
knowledge of our mortality instills within each person.   
 The spiritual harmony effect was not surprising when one considers the 
psychological flexibility model (Levin, Hildebrandt, Lillis, & Hayes, 2012), which is the 
basis for acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT).  ACT is a form of psychotherapy 
that partly focuses on committing oneself to complete value-based behaviors.  Trials of 
ACT therapy that specifically focused on commitment to values have evidenced 
beneficial effects in reducing one’s psychological distress (Levin et al., 2012), thus 
improving their mental health.  With this framework in mind, future research should 
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verify whether the beneficial effects of spiritual harmony are distinctly different from 
completing value-based behaviors in general.  Those who enact behaviors that are 
consistent with their values would be expected to have more favorable mental health 
levels, but clarifying that spiritual values are playing a unique role with one’s mental 
health would give more credibility to the claim that diverse forms of spirituality are 
strongly related to mental health, as the current findings indicated.   
 As noted previously, research has shown that the relationship between 
religiousness and mental health was stronger and more positive when religiousness was 
measured in the form of a personal/intrinsic religiousness type as opposed to an extrinsic 
religiousness type (Hackney & Sanders, 2003; Ventis, 1995).  It was speculated in the 
current paper that perhaps there was an overlap between personal/intrinsic religiousness 
and spirituality, given that spirituality’s definitions often declare it as something highly 
personal (Hood et al., 2009).  Support for an overlap between these two constructs 
manifested in the current study, but it is also worth noting that the magnitude of the effect 
of spiritual harmony on mental health exceeded even the strongest associations that 
personal/intrinsic religiousness had with mental health in previous studies.  The 
differences in magnitude between these variables suggest that they are not complete 
proxies for one another.  The correlation effect sizes in the current study showed that 
spiritual harmony’s relationship with each of the mental health variables exceeded the 
correlation effect size found in Hackney and Sanders’ meta-analysis which was a small 
sized effect, while the current study possessed mostly medium sized effects across the six 
mental health variables individually (altruism being the only exception).  Overall, the 
data suggested that the most linear relationship found in the current study was the 
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relationship between spiritual harmony and mental health.  In terms of descriptiveness 
and predictive usefulness, the spiritual harmony finding overshadowed the previously 
described linear association between religiousness and mental health as well as the 
curvilinear relationship between belief strength and mental health.     
 The relevance of the distinctive spiritual ideals between that of religious and 
secular participants  is reminiscent of the discussion of Spilka (1993) who referred to 
spirituality as a “fuzzy” concept because of its obscurity and diversified usage.  As the 
current study showed, participants, such as atheists and theists, who obviously have 
vastly differing perspectives on what spirituality means in their lives, still can relate to 
their spiritual ideals in adaptive or maladaptive ways and experience the same 
advantageous or disadvantageous consequences for their health regardless of the 
subjective content of their spiritual ideals.  The current study’s use of differing 
ideological perspectives only supported  the notion that creating a consistent and agreed 
upon usage for the term spirituality is difficult because, as Zinnbauer et al. (1997) 
explained, spirituality is idiosyncratic and highly personalized.  The findings of the 
current study underscored the importance of using innovative measurement methods like 
the SHALOM to measure spirituality.  While this measure was not perfect as to 
encompass all forms of spiritual diversity, it was more fitting compared to current 
measures in the field in regards to encapsulating respondent diversity and perhaps more 
measures should be created in a similar fashion that include a dual response system of 
comparing the endorsement of specific spiritual ideals with the extent one exhibits the 
corresponding behaviors and actions.  Zinnbauer, Pargament, and Scott (1999) detailed 
that psychologists struggle to conduct research with an agreed upon meaning for the 
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spirituality construct because they simultaneously strive to remain considerate of the 
pluralism that exists regarding spirituality’s definition.  The use of the discrepancy 
scoring system within the SHALOM not only allowed for one to be respectful to this 
pluralism, but it also created the opportunity for a research avenue that can conceivably 
investigate how assorted social groups are quantitatively and conceptually defining their 
idea of spirituality.  As a result, measures of this type can provide an arguably acceptable 
balance considerate of the tension between these pluralistic and definitional concerns.  
The literature review of the current paper gave several examples of how the past 
measurements of spirituality emphasized theism and/or Christianity despite the use of 
these scales with diverse populations.  In the future, spirituality will likely remain 
considered as a personal and subjective construct as it has in recent decades, and 
psychologists should consider accounting for this subjective measurement by allowing 
participants to define their spiritual ideals and then indicate how well they live up to 
those standards.   
 The current study also provided support to previous findings that secular persons 
are spiritual (e.g., Chappel, 1990).  Likewise, this also supported the notion that 
spirituality can operate outside of the confines of religion, just as Zinnbauer et al.’s 
(1997) sample demonstrated.  Future research could benefit the field’s understanding and 
conceptualizations by quantitatively exploring how secular spirituality and religious 
spirituality overlapped and where they diverged, as Chiu (2000) suggested.  Then, 
parsing this out even further by examining how groups within secularity and religion 
differentiate could expand the field’s understanding of spirituality even further.  Fisher’s 
(1998) definitional model of spiritual health was mostly supported in the current data, but 
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there appeared to be an incongruence of Fisher’s model with the way secular participants 
endorsed transcendent spirituality in particular.  The personal, communal, and 
environmental constructs coalesced strongly to form the spiritual health construct but the 
transcendent subconstruct did not.  Not surprisingly, this subconstruct in particular may 
only be relevant for those who actively believe in God or a similar divine entity.  If one 
considers secular spirituality specifically, then the recommendation of Kapuscinski and 
Masters (2010) may not stand, as these authors specifically recommended all spirituality 
scales include a transcendence component to help differentiate spirituality from other 
constructs.   Although, Kapuscinski and Masters made another suggestion that does 
indeed hold up when considering the results of the current study:  research that uses a 
spirituality measure that includes both inner experiences and overt behaviors may more 
clearly capture extant relationships with other constructs.  The SHALOM’s spiritual ideal 
and lived experience dual response system helped capture both the internal facets and the 
behavioral components of spirituality which may have helped elucidate the spiritual 
construct’s relationship with other variables.  Future research could verify whether 
spirituality measurement that includes both internal and behavioral facets provides 
incremental validity over spirituality measures that are only limited to one or the other to 
test Kapuscinski and Masters’ assertion.  Regardless, the current study provided evidence 
that a multifaceted spirituality measure captures a range of association strengths between 
variables.   
 Limitations.  Although the measurement of spiritual harmony achieved a 
respectable level of applicability to diverse social groups, its measurement could have 
been heightened more if other distinct belief components were introduced and 
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highlighted further.  Ideally speaking, participants would have been given an option to 
endorse pantheistic, polytheistic, and deistic spiritual beliefs as part of their spiritual 
ideals, to name a few.  Unfortunately, no spirituality measure uses a dual response system 
and includes items with such content in conjunction with the traditionally used theistic 
and Judeo-Christian reflective measures.  The measurement of spirituality harmony could 
have perhaps been more precise had participants been given the opportunity to endorse or 
exclude these characteristics as part of their beliefs about spiritual health.   
 Similar to the limitation of the measurement of religious/spiritual coping, 
understanding the facets of each person’s spiritual harmony and how they related to one’s 
mental health may have been more clear if qualitative methods were also used.  
Quantitative measures achieved a satisfactory level of applicability for the diverse 
sample, but the items of the quantitative measures are limited in their ability to illuminate 
the crucial mechanisms that link spiritual harmony with more favorable mental health.  
The inclusion of more mixed methods practices may help achieve further insights in 
future research.   
General Strengths, Limitations, and Future Considerations 
 The sample of the current study was simultaneously a strength and a limitation.  
The inclusion of agnostic, atheistic, Buddhist, spiritual nonreligious, and Jewish 
participants was a strength because they are understudied in the psychology of religion 
and spirituality field due to its Christian-centric history (Hood et al., 2009).  
Unfortunately, due to Muslim, Hindu, Taoist, Pagan, and several other ideologies 
completing the study in such small numbers, the current findings cannot safely be 
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attributed to them.  Future research would benefit from achieving even greater diversity 
than the current study so that the nuanced relationships between beliefs, coping, 
spirituality, and mental health are highlighted and potential differences can be learned 
about further.   
 The data collected for this study was gathered at a single time point and was 
based on self-reports.  Longitudinal research designs and methodologies that go beyond 
self-reports could help determine whether the relationship of these variables stays 
consistent.  Longitudinal methodologies in particular could allow a closer but still 
imperfect approximation of causal relationships.  Going beyond self-report data, such as 
using other sources of data conjunctively (e.g., observer ratings of participants’ mental 
health) in future studies may provide more clarity on the actual levels of mental health by 
reducing the error that is sometimes associated with self-report data.  
 The correlational nature of the current study limited the full scientific 
understanding of how each of the study’s variables truly related to each other.  For 
example, based on this study, it was tempting to say that living congruently with one’s 
spiritual values will subsequently improve one’s health; however, it is also plausible that 
the current study found that people who are initially healthy are just more likely have the 
capacity to live up to their spiritual value standards.  Thus, the directionality of the 
effects, or whether other outside variables were pertinently involved, could not be 
determined with the design of this study.   
 The general aim of this study was to be able to make conclusions about how 
belief strength, coping, and spirituality related to a general construct of mental health.  
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The inclusion of six mental health variables was enacted to be able to achieve this, but, 
unfortunately, the exploratory research question and each of the hypotheses (except for 
1a and 1b) used a composite latent construct of mental health that only included four of 
these mental health variables (hope, positive affect, life satisfaction, and gratitude).  The 
exclusion of the altruism and negative affect constructs was necessary due to statistical 
reasons for Hypotheses 2a, 2b, 3a, 3b, and the exploratory research question, but ideal 
conditions for interpretation would have allowed for the inclusion of all six of the 
constructs.  Also, in consideration that Hypothesis 1b illustrated how each of the mental 
health variables shared unique relationships with the groups being compared, it would be 
astute for researchers to use multiple conceptualizations of mental health and be vigilant 
for differential effects between groups in future studies.   
 Religious and secular group comparisons, the crux of this study, could have 
possibly been performed more accurately if more of the influences on the variability in 
mental health could have been isolated.  In particular, it may have been revelatory if the 
effects of Christian privilege had been accounted for.  Works such as Blumenfield (2006) 
and Schlosser (2003) both outlined how Christians in the United States are at a 
considerable advantage in acquiring numerous societal benefits over minority religious 
groups and secular groups.  This is especially pertinent because the current study was 
predominantly made up of people from the United States.  Access to these societal 
benefits may have accounted for the variability of mental health.  Societal benefits 
include many facets, but a few examples relevant to the concept of privilege for the 
current study include such matters as possessing a feeling of acceptance or appreciation 
within society at large, regularly seeing people of one’s own ideological identity status 
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depicted positively in the media, and being able to share one’s beliefs or opinions without 
fear of any repercussions when around others.  Recent research has highlighted how 
secular people are the target of discrimination in the USA, and the perpetrators of these 
acts, at least in one experimental situation, tended to be Christian (Swan & Heesacker, 
2012).  Only tentative conclusions should be made based off Swan and Heesacker’s study 
because their sample was predominately Christian at the outset.  Alternatively, Hammer, 
Cragun, Hwan, and Smith (2012) conducted a correlational study that questioned atheists 
about their experiences of discrimination that transpired in the last five years only.  
Despite this limited time frame, 41% reported experiencing acts that included slander, 
coercion, social ostracism, denial of goods and services, and hate crimes, all due to their 
identification as atheist.  Hammer et al. declared that experiences of discrimination 
should be a considered variable whenever religion/spirituality and health association 
research is being performed.  Some of the subtle mental health differences between the 
religious and secular participants in the current study might have lessened or even 
disappeared if the impact of discrimination was controlled for.  This could also be valid 
for the religious participants, who, despite being the majority group in the United States, 
still may experience stigmatization and discrimination themselves.  The inclusion of 
discrimination as a variable in future analyses is warranted especially when numerous 
studies have shown that discrimination negatively impacts mental health, even when 
other class distinctions are controlled for (e.g., Kessler, Mickelson, & Williams, 1999).  
The inclusion of discrimination is especially pertinent when one also considers that 
atheists are viewed as potentially the single most unaccepted and stigmatized group in the 
United States both publicly and privately.  Edgell, Gerteis, and Hartmann (2006) found 
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that atheists were ranked number one on lists of “This group does not at all agree with my 
vision of American society” and “I would disapprove if my child wanted to marry a 
member of this group” while Muslims, despite also being frequent targets of 
discrimination, appeared in a distant second on both lists.  Notions of privilege and 
discrimination as they pertain to secular groups and non-Christian religious groups 
should be accounted for in future studies regarding mental health comparisons between 
groups.   
A Final Thought 
 One of the most notable implications of the current study is that the impaired 
mental health stigma against secular participants (e.g., Schumaker, 1992) is at the very 
least an exaggeration.  Grounds for declaring that there is a substantial mental health 
disparity between religious and secular groups was not supported in the current study.  
An implication that can be drawn from the results of this study was that a vital 
component of one’s mental health is their ability to live in accordance with their spiritual 
health values, whatever those may be.  General health initiatives and service providers 
may want to consider encouraging spiritual living in particular.   Applicable services 
could include encouraging children’s healthy spiritual behaviors in schools, integrating 
spiritual components into psychotherapy, increasing the well-being of patients in 
hospitals, or disseminating healthy living information via various media sources to 
consumers.  Specifically, any of these communication or interactive avenues that aim to 
positively impact the health of their respective consumers could devote time to 
facilitating the reflection of one’s spiritual values.  As follows, teaching and imploring 
these service recipients to enact behaviors in their daily life that are congruent with their 
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personally decided and reflected upon spiritual health values could be the impetus for 
healthier living.  Such a health service advocacy process would inherently be cross-
culturally considerate, because it encourages people to discover their own spiritual 
values, which then adds to the widespread and personalized applicability.  Numerous 
societal venues, such as schools and medical centers, teach patrons how to live a 
physically healthy life and a mentally healthy life.  If continued research supports the 
current findings, perhaps it would be time for society to begin emphatically encouraging 
people to discover and pursue action that is congruent with their personalized definitions 
of spiritual health.   
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Professional Workshops & Trainings 
 
08/2013-ongoing Acceptance and Commitment Therapy Mini Lecture Series 
 and Consultation Calls - Monthly VA teleconferences with 
 various ACT national trainers 
 
10/2013 Motivational Interviewing Training- John Steinberg & Teri 
 Bolte  - Cincinnati, OH - Cincinnati VAMC 
 
10/2013 Regional Cognitive Processing Therapy Training 
 Workshop - Jennifer Lewis, Kerry Renner & Carrie 
 Robinson - Columbus, OH - Chalmers P. Wylie VA 
 Ambulatory Care Center 
 
08/2013 Matrix Model Treatment for Substance Dependence 
 Training - Donna Johnson - Cincinnati, OH - Cincinnati 
 VAMC 
 
Professional Membership & Additional Service 
 
2008-present Affiliate - American Psychological Association 
 
2013-present Affiliate - Association of VA Psychologist Leaders 
 
2013-present Student Member - Association for Contextual Behavioral 
 Science 
 
2009-2012 Graduate Assistantship - Department of Educational 
 and Counseling Psychology - U of Louisville - Louisville, 
 KY    
 Contributed to research related activities for scholarly 
 publication, taught undergraduate course sections, assisted 
 in practicum placement process.  
 Supervisors:  Drs. Jesse Owen, Mark Leach, and Stephanie 
 Budge. 
   
2010-2011 Ad Hoc Reviewer for Psychology of Religion and 
 Spirituality   
 Supervisor:  Dr. Mark Leach 
 
2006-2007 Research Assistantship - School of Behavioral and 
 Brain  Sciences - University of Texas at Dallas - 
 Richardson, TX 
 Observational coder and proctor for a longitudinal multi-
 method study on social aggression among youth. 
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 Supervisor:  Dr. Marion Underwood 
 
Honors & Awards 
 
2012 Doctoral Dissertation Completion Award Fellowship - 
 University of Louisville 
 
2006, 2007 Dean’s List - University of Texas at Dallas 
 




08/2013-present LGBT Task Force - Cincinnati VAMC.  Promote an LGBT 
 affirmative atmosphere and consult with clinicians and 
 Veterans on LGBT issues  
 
02/2013 Eating Disorder Awareness Week - Bellarmine University.  
 Led students in creating a body affirmation mural for 
 dining hall 
 
10/2012 Stress Management Seminar - Bellarmine University.  
 Provided information about counseling center services and 
 the personal use of adaptive emotion regulation strategies 
 
10/2012 Ignite Leadership Conference - Bellarmine University.  
 Taught student organization leaders how to improve 
 intragroup communication and handling conflict resolution  
 
10/2012 Professional Development Talk - Bellarminue University.  
 Guest speakership for an undergraduate psychology class 
 where I discussed professional development issues 
 
09/2012 Safe Zone Educational Seminar - Bellarmine University.  
 Educated faculty, staff, and students about LGBTIQ issues, 
 how to become an ally, and how to promote nurturance of 
 LGBTIQ persons 
 
04/2011 PostSecret Suicide Prevention project - University of 
 Louisville.  Provided crisis intervention services to those 
 experiencing psychological issues during event proceedings  
 
02/2011 Body Awareness Body Appreciation Week - University of 
 Louisville.  Staffed table to provide information and 
 explain services provided by the counseling center with 
 specific regard to body image and eating disorders 




10/2010 Take Back the Night - University of Louisville.  Staffed 
 table to explain services of provided by the counseling 
 center 
 
08/2010 “Move In Days” - University of Louisville.  Assisted 
 Housing and Residential Life staff with moving new 
 students into residential halls 
 
